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1CHAPTER I
literature review and methodology
The Development of Research in Educational Politics
An enormous quantity of works devoted to the general
study of local decision making and power structure have
been produced by social scientists since the Lvnds’ classic
analysis of Middletown (Muncie, Indiana) was published in
1929. 1 The early 1950’s marked the development of what to
some extent remains a major controversy over elitist vs.
pluralistic views of influence in community decision making,
ihe basic issue has been whether or not the urban community
is characterized by a unified and enduring oligarchy of
power rather than a more amorphous and changing configura-
tion which differs markedly from issue to issue. Associated
with this controversy about substance is one of method,
mainly between the ’’reputational technique” as introduced and
typified by the work of Floyd Hunter2 and the "issue approach"
as exemplified by Robert Dahl’s study of New Haven.
^
Later assessments of decision making research have found
that results seem to be predetermined by the method of
study: researchers select their techniques with the
assumption of pluralism or oligarchy in mind, and they are
usually confirmed by their results. ^ It is noteworthy that
a growing number of studies have used a combination of
methods in an attempt to overcome built-in biases. Many
2works have explicitly compared the results obtained by one
method with those obtained by using another.
5
A third school in the theory of community power is what
Richard Merelman has termed the "neo-elitist critique" of
community decision making. Meo-elitist or antipluralist
writers have focused attention on non-elites and "non-
issues” or ’’nondecisions” as opposed to power structures and
decision making as such. This approach does not dispute the
pluralistic contention that elites are specialized and num-
erous. The argument here is that fragmentation of power does
not necessarily guarantee pluralism in the sense that all
major interests in the community are indirectly represented
through these multiple power centers and that all important
issues eventually reach the official decision making arena.
In their study of Baltimore, Peter Bachrach and Morton
Baratz maintain that political systems and sub-systems
develop a "mobilization of bias" in the community based on
a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institu-
tional procedures that operate systematically and consistent-
ly to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the
expense of others. They suggest that the primary means of
sustaining a given mobilization of bias is "nondecision
making"; that is, decision making which is instrumental in
preventing an issue, potentially threatening to the values
or interests of the decision makers, from reaching the
relevant decision making arena. Thus, they contend that
only issues and non-issues which represent a challenge to
3the predominant values or the established "rules of the game"
can provide a true picture of community power.
Many studies devoted specifically to political influence
in educational nolicymaking, which is the subject of this
paper
,
reflect the tyre of findings associated with one view
or the other in the original elitist-pluralist dispute.
Using the reputational technique of asking a panel of in-
formants who had power, leadership and influence, Hunter
found in Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia ) that a monolithic
power structure of "economic dominants" monopolized influ-
ence over all local policy issues including education. This
finding was derived by nominations of reputedly influential
community figures from individuals who were at the center
of the communication and institutional structure of the
community.
On the other hand, Dahl’s use of the issue approach in
New Haven uncovered little evidence of "the more or less
covert determination of community policies by a politically
homogeneous economic and social elite." By asking commun-
ity leaders who had actually been involved in making a
specific decision, he found that few individuals had a
significant amount of influence in more than one issue area.
Influence over decisions in public education was exerted
"almost entirely by public officials", in particular, the
mayor, members of the board of education and the super-
intendent of schools. Other individuals and groups with
special interests in the Dublic schools were, when aroused,
d
able to make their influence felt.
4
l6W studies to date have explicitly applied the concept
of nondecision making to the analysis of educational
policymaking. However, works by Marilyn Gittell and others
have given particular attention to the closed and narrow
base of power and influence in educational politics and
have attempted to describe the institutional roadblocks to
broader community participation. 9 Such works have gener-
ally used a modified version of the issue approach involving
interviews with non-elites and groups outside the trad-
itional policymaking arena. Studies of community control
of schools, in particular, have discussed the efforts of
blacks and other minority groups to overcome institutional
barriers to effective influence over educational policy. 10
This body of diverse research indicates that patterns
of influence vary considerably from community to community
in relations to a number of historical, institutional and
socio-economic factors. Furthermore, it suggests that
there is no shortcut, no simple and mechanical method for
gaining a full understanding of the decision making process
in a community. Many analysts have pointed to the need for
more detailed information on patterns of influence in
community subsystems as a first step. Such detail could
provide the basis for a more accurate analysis of community
power structures in general, many social scientists agree.
Sayre and rolsby, for example, note that nthe small decision
making arena often provides the research setting within
which to discover the competition, the accommodations and
the alliances among the groups most relevant to urban
politics
.
^
In light of recent upheavals involving the nation’s
schools, there can be little doubt that public education
is one such community subsystem of utmost importance today.
In urban areas, education has become a focal point in
efforts to achieve racial equality, social harmony, indust-
rial development and economic viability. The massive in-
vestment of public funds in education in recent years
underscores the significance of decisions regarding public
school systems. Dearly every community in the nation de-
votes a major portion of its budget to education, and the
/
superintendent of schools is generally one of the highest
paid city officials.
Despite the obvious significance of educational policy-
making, school politics were largely neglected by social
scientists before the last decade or so.^ In recent years,
large numbers of social scientists have concentrated in the
area of education, most likely prompted by highly visible
developments in this field—in particular, the civil rights
and desegregation controversies of the 1960’s. The litera-
ture now offers a substantial number of case studies and
14
other research as a frame of reference.
This case study does not attempt to delineate power and
influence on a community-wide basis; rather, the emphasis
here is on the process of decision making and the kind of
political influence specifically characteristic of local
school systems. In order to further reduce the subject to
6manageable proportions, detailed analysis will be limited
to the formulation and implementation of personnel policy.
While Dersonnel policy is only one of several major and
often interrelated facets of educational policy, its impact
can Dervade an entire organization. The creation or elim-
ination of posts and the control of salaries, aopointments
and dismissals within a system is often a determining
factor in policy outputs in other areas. Some studies of
bureaucracies have shown that the replacement of officials
within an organization is one of the major means of bringing
about change.^ In addition, recent studies of educational
politics have suggested the restriction of lay access to the
decision making process is at least partially tied to bur-
eaucratic control of recruitment policies and standards.
^
This research is aimed at describing the decision making
process in personnel policy and at determining who is in-
fluential in this area and who is not.
Decision Making in Public Education
Almost every study of educational politics conducted
during the past decade or so has shown that decision making
in urban and suburban schools systems is characterized by
certain distinctive features. Among these is the unusual
degree to which school government is insulated from elec-
toral politics and other local government functions.
Roscoe Martin and others have ascribed this isolation to
7the "political culture" of education in America * 1
7
Not only
schoolmen, but other community leaders and the general public
have for many years paid lip service at least to the tra-
ditional view that education must be "taken out of politics"
and safeguarded by professional educators who alone can
serve the public interest. More recent movements in gen-
eral urban government reform! which emphasized economy and
efficiency, civil service reform, professionalism and cen-
tralization, tended to confirm longstanding attitudes about
education. In such an atmosphere, Martin suggests, school
officials have been successful to a marked degree in sep-
arating themselves from outside political forces regardless
of the socio-economic nature and location of the community.
Special governmental arrangements have in many cases
reinforced this tradition of political separatism. School
systems are legal entities created to operate independently
from the local governments in whose geographic jurisdiction
they are located. Education is a state function, controlled
by state law. Many school systems are fiscally independent
of government and are empowered to raise revenues themselves.
Approximately three-fourths of the nation’s school boards
have some degree of budgetary autonomy. ' Nevertheless,
school systems are political systems, governed, at least
nominally, by local school boards whose members are usually
elected, although sometimes appointed. However, the method
of selection for members, typically by at-large elections,
often contributes to the political isolation oi school board
8members. In addition, the school board elections generally
assume an aura of nonpartisanship in which specific issues
are rarely presented to the voters. Thus, board members do
not usually have a policy mandate from their campaigns.
Michael Kirst reports that political institutions, in any
case, reflect rather than explain school politics. A
closed system of policymaking seems to be the rule even when
school boards are appointed and are formally under the juris-
diction of other community governing bodies
.
20
Isolated from other community political bodies and lacking
specific policy views derived from a ward or subcommunity
electoral base, school board members often play a passive
role in education policymaking, according to Keith Gold-
hammer. In addition, board members are often unsalaried,
and their effectiveness in initiating and implementing
policy depends, to a large extent, on personal determination
and skill in bargaining and persuading. Generally, board
members have little or no staff assistance and must depend
on professional administrators fcr information and direc-
21tion. Under these conditions, the roles of the super-
intendent of schools and other top administrators become
pivotal.
Generally, a superintendent is recruited from within the
system. He is traditionally an educator with some admini-
strative experience. As the system’s chief administrator,
he is responsible for a variety of tasks which have become
9increasingly numerous and complex. In attending to these
tasks, the superintendent depends on a professional bureau-
cracy at central headquarters and a field staff of school
administrators, dominated to varying degrees by the super-
intendent himself. As often happens in other bureaucracies,
the superintendent may largely dictate policy to a school
board, while meeting entrenched resistance in some internal
matters from key members of his own staff.
The headquarters staff and the superintendent often con-
trol more significant resources for affecting the outcome
of policy than any other set of actors in the educational
system. 22 In explaining the importance of top administra-
tors, Martin notes their power "resides chiefly in their
roles as initiators of issues in the first instance, expert
advisors and aides to the nominal decision maker (the board
of education) in the second instance, and implementers of the
policies agreed upon in the end."23 The bureaucracy jealous-
ly tends to guard the power it has developed over the years.
In the name of professionalism, educational administrators
have organized urban and suburban school systems in a
manner that greatly restricts community access to the
points of decision making. In addition, they have mustered
the general support of those nonprofessional actors in the
community who are content with the educational output of the
system. As might be expected, First found bureaucratic
dominance was strongest in essentially internal matters such
10
as personnel, curriculum and budget content, where time, man-
power and technical knowledge are of the essence. In de-
cisions of a more "external” nature—for example, integration
policies, overall size of the budget and bond issues—the
influence of the school board, certain city officials, in
particular
,
the mayor, and community interest groups may
assume an important role.^
In recent years, however, the power and influence of top
administrators has been challenged. Teachers, among others,
have become increasingly vocal in demanding a greater voice
in educational policy. In many communities, teachers have
become increasingly more militant in the past few years, and
have succeeded in forming themselves into professional organ-
izations and units of great strength. Where they have de-
veloped real cohesion, teachers’ unions have become powerful
actors in the educational system. In such instances, they
wield a great deal of influence over salaries, promotions
and working conditions. Nevertheless, Rosenthal and others
have found the political pressure of teachers is usually
relegated to "bread and butter” issues. To date, he says,
their influence rarely extends to curriculum, facilities and
the program areas of the budget.
j
n addition, Oittell
maintains that teacher organizations have operated within the
framework of existing systems, and in fact are often allied
with administrators in efforts to maintain the system. She
explains this state of affairs as a result, in part, of the
11
backgrounds of the teachers. They are understandably reluc-
tant to depreciate the role of the professional in education.
Inculcated with the concepts of merit examination, discipline
and hierarchial administrative control, they tend to oppose
changes which would erode the prevailing system.^ -
City officials, especially the mayor, often play a de-
cisive role when the basic allocation of community resources
is at stake. While the mayor does not typically become in-
volved in program decision regarding the budget, his influ-
ence may be a major factor in overall budget ceilings, capi-
tal expenditures involving bond issues and, in some cases,
in salary increases for teachers. Often teachers initially
present their salary demands to the superintendent, but in
some communities they now carry their case directly to the
school board and the mayor. In Dudget and capital issues,
economic leaders and taxpayers 1 associations may also be
influential. In this context, the superintendent sometimes
plays a "balancing" role between the key participants m the
budget process (taxpayers’ groups, teachers’ organizations,
etc.) In most communities, the superintendent attempts to
anticipate how much of an increase in the tax rate the
community and city officials will tolerate in making x-ecom-
menoations to the school board, in some communities
,
the
board of education or the mayor have assumed the role of
27
influence Droker in financial matters.
Political party leaders and other local politicians,
12
including the mayor, have, in various cases, taken a rather
persistent interest in the outcomes of personnel decisions,
with varying degrees of success. The intervention of
politicians in personnel policy is usually explained as a
desire to do favors for political allies in order to build
and maintain their political strength. In addition, ethnic
groups have also exerted pressure either directly on school
officials or through political leaders in order to attain
proper representation in the upper echelons of the school
system. In recent years, black leaders have shown in-
creasing interest in personnel policy as it relates to
racial discrimination, not only in administrative posts,
but also in the hiring of teaching and nonprofessional
personnel. However, all of these groups must overcome
resistance to outside intervention from a well-entrenched
system of tenure, promotion from within and merit examin-
ation based on white middle-class norms.
Robert Crain found the board of education and at times
the mayor usually play a crucial role in concerting and
aggregating influence in order to adopt integration pro-
posals. In the past, at least, black leaders and civil
rights groups have lobbied strongly for the effective in-
tegration of schools, while white parents have been a source
of opposition to school integration. Crain stresses the
superintendent’s lack of influence and understanding of
this issue. It appears that the superintendent is unable
to deal with the issue because he regards it as a social
13
(not educational ) controversy. Consequently, the problem
is left for the school board and the mayor to negotiate 1
with the various community forces. 2 ^
In addition to the school board, administrators, teachers
and the mayor, there are a variety of nonprofessional groups
often involved in education, though these affect education
policy only peripherally. The school-parent associations
form one such group. As representatives of those most
directly affected by education policy, these associations
might be expected to wield considerable influence on the
schools system. Nevertheless, as a rule they tend to serve
as a vehicle of support for policies formulated within the
bureaucracy. Even as agents of the school administration,
their impact is often limited by lack of political know-how
or other resources. In exceptional cases, however, parent
associations have been able to force changes or block inno-
vation in school policy. In another category are those
civic groups interested in "good education." These are
analogous in aim and function to good-government groups.
Along with parent groups, civic groups are generally supp-
ortive of existing systems, representative of middle-class
citizenry and opposed to any challenge to administrative and
professional prerogatives.
The press represents one interested and often neglected
source of potential influence on school policy. Its role
both as informer and advocate may play an important part
in the success or defeat of a certain program. Local radio,
14
television and newspaper editorials have had varying degrees
of impact on actual policy decisions. Their influence may
be closely tied to the personal prestige and political in-
fluence policy through the type of presentation and amount
of coverage given an issue. In particular, the growing use
of protest as a means of increasing community influence on
school officials has given added importance to news coverage.
Students, teachers and minority groups often seek the supp-
ort of a wider public to which the school superintendent
and the board are sensitive. Such protestors often rely on
conveying information about their goals and grievances
through the public communications network.
^
In communities where a large number of parents send their
children to Catholic parochial schools, it might be expected
that the Catholic Church would exert a good deal of pressure
on public school decisions. High parochial school enroll-
ment is common along the Eastern seaboard, but is almost
unknown in the Middle West and Far West. Where such sep-
aration between public and private school population exists,
it often has an important impact on the level of comm,unity
support for the public schools. Latent opposition to in-
creasing the outlays on public schools is predictably gen-
erated in many cases among parents who assume a double load
of costs for education—local taxes and private tuitions.
In addition, the increasing number of parochial school
closings has recently forced public school officials to seek
the cooperation of parochial school administrators in solv-
15
in£ problems created by the heavy influx of former paro-
chial school students. Nevertheless, existing research has
produced little evidence of direct church pressure on public
school decision makers at the local level
.
32
However, the
situation is in a state of change and such pressures could
develop in the future. Certainly in those parts of the
country where parochial school enrollment is high, the
Catholic Church has actively lobbied at the state level for
public aid to parochial schools.
The newest set of actors in the educational system are
the civil rights groups and community organizations. In
many urban areas, the exodus of middle-class whites and the
influx of lower-class and nonwhite residents has created
Dressing needs in education. At the same time, the expec-
tations of the deprived have risen as a result of civil
rights and integration movements, and state and federal
programs have been set up to correct past inequities. One
of the first areas of attack by civil rights and community
groups has been the city school system because it represents
such an important part of the total structure of government
and so essential a link to mobility in American society.
Their involvement has been the stimulant for considerable
conflict. During the 1950's and early 1960's such groups
worked to bring about school integration and curriculum
changes geared to the "culturally and economically deprived"
student. 33 However, the failure of integration plans and
16
compensatory education programs has led many of these groups
to look to a reform of educational institutions for solu-
tions. Such grouns have charged that the isolation of the
educational bureaucracy leaves it ill-equipped to handle the
new problems of poverty, racial discrimination and language
difficulties. In a number of cities, community leaders and
ghetto dwellers have pressed demands for decentralization of
school systems and for some kind of community control over
curriculum, personnel and/or budget policies. To many groups
representing the poor and nonwhite, effective influence over
educational policy now seems to depend on a breaking down of
the present structure and a re-evaluation of the ideology
. 34
which governs that structure,
he only source of power, however, for many minority
groups is ethnic solidarity—for which voting provides a
dubious outlet. Certainly the entrance of civil rights and
community groups into the educational arena has served to
erode the traditional notion of schools systems as apoliti-
cal and untouchable entities subject only to the sanctity
of professional decision making. Gittell and Hevesi main-
tain that it was because of civil rights activities that
social scientists began to study school systems as political
systems, viewing school policy as basic political and social
policy. Nevertheless, the actual influence of such groups
over educational policy has often been minimal though this
varies considerably from community to community.^ In any
case, such efforts have usually been an uphill battle, since
17
any restructuring of the educational system must overcome
the deeply entrenched opposition of those elements with a
vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
In sum, much of the existing research indicates educa-
tional policy in most communities is determined to a large
extent by a single bureaucratic organization. In terms of
the community-at-large, the most significant actor in most
public education issues is the superintendent of schools.
However, bureaucratic decision making studies in other areas
have repeatedly shown that subordinate staff members often
behave in ways not formally prescribed. The number and
diversity of decentralized decisions to be made within a
school system is enormous. While many such decisions have
only limited consequences, policies formulated by top
administrators may be significantly altered by the manner
in which they are implemented over a long period of time.
Evidence gathered in other bureaucracies suggests that some
modification of agency goals and policies by teachers,
principals and other staff members is likely to exist in
most public school systems.'^ More specifically, some stud-
ies of school politics have indicated that the superintend-
ents’s influence over top line and staff officers varies
considerably among cities. In certain areas, his influence
with the school board may be greater than it is with top
administrators. In personnel policy, for instance, a
superintendent who wishes to appoint new administrators
from outside the system may be thwarted by his own staff
and by educational tradition.^
The kind of bureaucratic predominance in educational
decision making described above and confirmed by numerous
studies of urban and suburban school systems negates the
thesis of an informal power elite of economic dominants
advanced by Hunter. Host research so far has concluded the
a ^i-Tity to exert crucial influence and to concert action on
proposals in the area of budget, personnel and curriculum,
rests for the most part with persons who are involved in
educational matters because they hold official positions
in educational institutions or public affairs .
^
Certain
exceptions, however, have been documented which indicate
that an economic elite may control education in some areas,
especially in the rural South. In a comparative study of
four rural southern school districts, Kimbrough discovered
behind-the-scenes informal power groupings which had crucial
influence over educational policy along with most other
areas of local government.^-0 Also, Peter Schrag’s study of
schools in Appalachia found that local politicians used the
schools as a patronage operation and source of contacts for
local businessmen who could keep them in office.
^
On the other hand, this research indicates that a tra-
dition of political isolation has strongly limited the
influence not only of economic elites, but all other interest
groups and individuals outside the educational establishment.
Deviations from this pattern are often found on certain
issues or in special cases. Nevertheless, from a political
19
science viewpoint, school policymaking is distinctive be-
cause of its lack of established procedures for generating
alternative proposals to those advanced by school officials.
General statements about political influence must, of
course, be considered within the context of outside con-
straints on local policymakers. A growing body of state
regulations: levy limitations, state mandated services,
salary schedules, tenure provisions and other staff bene-
fits, place a large portion of the typical local budget
beyond the control of local school officials. State edu-
cation codes may also specify textbooks, curriculum programs
and teacher accreditation standards to be used in all local
schools. In addition, state and federal mandates regarding
integration have molded local policy in this area.
Extra
-community organizations in the private sector as
well as political institutions may indirectly change the
basic pattern of influence in a decision area by intro-
ducing new resources and sanctions into the community. In
education, local employees’ unions and civil rights groups
often draw on the capital and human resources of state and
national organizations to enhance their influence. In
another vein, the increasing involvement of federal and
state governments in local education has, in some cases,
provided the machinery through which community leaders and
government officials have been able to challenge the iso-
lated influence of the educational bureaucracy. For example,
20
the federal government requires community participation in
the allocation and administration of funds provided under
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965>2 Con-
trol of the political weight and contacts needed to obtain
federal and state grants may enhance the influence of a
mayor or other political leader. A number of recent ana-
lyses specifically noted the importance of extra-community
relationships as a factor in local political influence. 43
Recent studies also make it plain that educational de-
cision making is in a state of flux. While the old tra-
dition of political isolation still prevails, which in
practice leaves policy decisions largely to the superinten-
dent and other top administrators, new forces both outside
and within the community are beginning to challenge this
pattern. As a result, the political nature of educational
decisions can no longer be ignored or denied. The political
processes and pressures which help to determine such de-
cisions are now being examined and re-examined by both social
scientists and educators. The goal of the present study is
to describe and evaluate the present state of political
relationships between the public schools, the community and
the political system in the area of personnel policy#
Conceptual Framework
In laying a foundation for this report, certain concep-
tual tools were used. These have been derived from a vari-
ety of works which touch on the theory of decision making
21
and serve as a framework for analysis.
Any discussion of decision making must begin with some
definition of the concept of power and the related idea of
influence* The literature in this area is vast. The follow
ing definitions were selected as most useful here. For the
purposes of this study power will be viewed as the potential
ability of an actor or actors to bring about change in the
goals of a social system. An individual will be designated
as powerful only in relation to a given social system and
his command of power resources relevant to that system.
While power is restricted to potential ability to bring
about change, influence is defined as the actual use of
this ability. Power, then, is conceived as a distribution
of resources which may be converted into influence.
Power is further defined as the function of two variables
1 ) access to resources and 2) the belief of other actors
within the decision making arena that such access exists.
In this definition, reputation is a kind of resource, a
source of power or potential influence.
^
Although any typology of resources is to some degree
arbitrary, those often cited include: 1) money and credit;
2) control over jobs
; 3) control of mass media; 4) high
social status; 5) knowledge and specialized skills; 6) popu-
larity and esteemed personal qualities; 7) legality and
authority; £) subsystem solidarity; 9) the right to vote;
10) social access to community leaders; 11) commitment of
followers; 12) manpower and control of organizations;
22
13) control over the interpretation of values such as the
authority to interpret a law or administer a policy. In
addition, the use of protest as a political resource and
ties with extra
-community organizations and institutions
ore important resources in the present description of
influence
.
Resources may be used to influence a decision indirectly
in two general ways: 1) by sanctioning or adding new ad-
vantages or disadvantages to the situation of a decision
maker and 2) by persuasion or affecting the orientation of
the decision maker by changing the way he sees a desired
outcome in relation to his own goals. Certain resources
such as authority may be applied directly in decision making.
The manner in which a resource may be used indirectly often
depends on the belief of others as to whether an actor
actually has the ability to sanction. In many cases, the
use of resources does not require sanctioning to be effec-
tive. An actor who is believed to control certain resources
is usually able to influence the decision making process at
an earlier point in time than the actor who is not credited
with control of resources. Sanctioning, if applied at all,
usually occurs during the later stages of decision making or
after the decision has been made. For example, a decision is
often influenced by the promise (implicit or explicit) of
future favors. Use of a given resource also depends on a
number of environmental factors and on the particular decision
23
under consideration. Any one resource may be of crucial
importance in one decision making situation and totally
inappropriate in another due to the absence of a receptor
or receotors for such a resource. For example, technical
exoertise could make the superintendent highly influential
with the school board in a curriculum decision, while his
expertise might be ineffective in determining the overall
size of the school budget. In the case of the budget, the
school board might be receptive to political and financial
resources, but not to specialized knowledge. The generality
of a resource denotes the number of contexts or actors for
which the same resource is effective in influencing.^
For the purposes of analysis, five characteristics of
decisions have been identified: 1) the functional area in
which they are made, in this case, education; 2) the actors
likely to be involved in influencing a decision; 3) the po-
tential effect or outcome of a specific decision (decisions
in this study will affect personnel policy); 4) the process
or stages of decision making, and 5) the use of decisions to
suppress issues which challenge the interests or values of
the decision maker (nondecision making). Use of the repu-
tational method has increased our understanding of the ac-
tors likely to be involved in decision making by focusing
on the potential or behind-the-scenes influence of some
community actors. Studies using the issue approach have
further contributed to the study of decision making by
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showing the significance of functional areas such as edu-
cation, public health and the like, in the description of
community power. However, many works using either or both
of these methods do not discuss either the stages of decision
making at which important actors become involved or t he im-
pact of potential outcomes on the kinds of actors involved.
In addition, few studies have examined the way in which
decisions are used to prevent threatening issues from
reaching the agenda of a decision making body. Thus, some
elaboration of the last three characteristics of decisions
listed above would seem in order,
Terry Clark’s illustration of the importance of decision
outcomes in an analysis of patterns of influence is particu-
larly pertinent here.^ Clark notes that when considering
an issue from a functional standpoint, attention will be
focused on those actors who are involved or likely to be
involved in the particular functional area. He delineates
four types of actors as generally involved in a decision:
1 ) producers—those who supply the commodity whose distri-
bution is decided upon; 2) consumers—those who receive the
commodity allocated through the decision; 3) entrepreneurs
—
those who initiate, mediate, bargain and compromise in de-
cisions between various sets of producers, consumers and
other system actors, and 4) enactors—those whose duty it
is to supervise the enactment and implementation of a
decision.
In the area of public education in most major communities,
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Clark says, one expects to find producers-teachers
; consum-
” rS children and their parents; enactors-school admini-
strators; and entrepreneurs-the mayor, the board of edu-
cation and citizens’ groups with a particular interest in
-aucation. This classification might serve as an adequate
description of the actors involved 5- education decision
making as long as the outcome or potential outcome of a
decision preserves the status quo or is likely to affect
only those actors cited. If, however, the impact of the
decision under consideration has implications outside its
proper functional area or a change in the existing allo-
cation or resources is at stake, other actors are likely to
become involved. For example, a proposed increase in the
budget for education usually arouses taxpayers and their
renresentatives 0 Civil rights and minority groups are
usually active when integration plans or community control
of schools is under consideration.
Writings on the politics of education usually divide
decision outcomes or issue areas into internal matters—
curriculum, personnel, budget content; and external issues—
integration policy, budget ceilings, capital projects.^?
The following study will be principally devoted to an ex-
amination of the actors, strategies, resources and decision
processes involved in personnel policymaking. It can be
expected that a given set of actors will normally be involved
in personnel decisions. However, the potential effect or
outcome of a certain issue might bring new actors into play.
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It is also true that a decision in one issue area could
have implications for policy in another area. For example,
an increase m the budget is usually reauired if the staff
is to be enlarged. Therefore, the potential outcome of
decisions and the interrelationship of issue areas will be
taken into consideration in our efforts to identify the
actors and processes involved in the formulation of person-
nel- policy.
As in the case of various decision outcomes, the actors
in/olved in influencing a decision may vary from one stage
of the decision making process to another.^ A model of
policy selection from initiation to final implementation
could theoretically involve an enormous number of stages.
Five principal steps seem sufficient for this study. They
are: 1) issue recognition or initiation of the decision
making process; 2 ) information collection and detailed
formulation of policy; 3) gaining support for or organizing
opposition to a proposal; 4) policy selection or overt de-
cision making and 5) enactment or implementation of a de-
cision. Influence on policy often occurs at stages of the
decision making process prior to or subsequent to the
authoritative selection of policy. Of course, the fact that
an individual or group is active at one of these several
stages is not in itself evidence of influence. A person has
influence only to the degree that his or her action, or his
or her anticipated action, affects the substance of the ul-
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tirrate policy or results in its success or defeat. However,
some recognition of the multi-stage character of the decision
making process seems essential to a full understanding of
rolicy formation and to the identification of influentials
.
In order to empirically determine patterns of influence
and processes of decision making, it seems necessary to in-
vestigate, among other things, the specific issues which are
raised. However, there is always the possibility that other
issues n or problems are not being discussed, or in fact,
are being directly or indirectly suppressed. Bachrach and
and Baratz, as noted earlier, have termed this aspect of the
decision making process "nondecision making." In Power and
Poverty
,
they list several forms which nondecision making
can take.^' They are: 1) the use or threatened use of
force to prevent demands for change in the established order
from entering the political process, as in the case of
harassment, beatings, even murder of civil rights workers
in the rural South; 2) the exercise of power by invoking
sanctions against the initiator of a potentially threatening
demand—these may be negative or positive, ranging from
intimidation (denial of bank credit, dismissal from employ-
ment) to co-optation (promotion, bribery); 3) the invocation
of an existing bias of the political system—a norm, pre-
cedent, rule or procedure—to squelch such a threatening
demand; 4) the deflection of a challenge by referring the
demands or issues to committees or commissions for detailed
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and prolonged study or by steering them through time-
consuming and ritualistic routines that are built into the
political system, and 5) the reshaping or strengthening of
the "mobilization of bias" in order to block challenges to
the prevailing allocation of values, for example, the
establishment of additional rules and procedures for pro-
cessing demands.
Thus, nondecision making may come into play when the
vested interests or values or decision makers are threatened,
the mobilization of bias of an organization or institution
is challenged, or when demands are made for change in the
existing allocation of benefits in the community. Non-
decision making may take the form of seemingly unimportant
decisions or it may remain entirely behind-the-scenes. In
any case, it is important to keep in mind the many facets
of this phenomenon in order to explain how decisions are
made and who makes them. In the field of education, the
concept of nondecision making is particularly relevant
where attempts have been made to generate new sources of
power, authority and influence in an effort to alter the
political process.
Project Design
The findings presented in this report are based on a
case study of the public schools system in Mew Bedford,
Massachusetts, from 1970 to 1972. A small coastal city in
the southeastern area of the state, New Bedford is beset by
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problems common to urban areas across the nation: high
unemployment, a stagnant economy, a significant number of
non-English speaking residents, racial conflict, the flight
to the suburbs by many middle-class whites and the impending
closure of parochial schools now serving a large number of
potential public school students. All of these factors have
created pressing needs in the area of education. The in-
tensity of such problems in Few Bedford is indeed unusual
for a city of its size (approximately 100,000 inhabitants),
though not without parallel, particularly in the Northeast.
In terms of educational institutions, the Few Bedford School
Committee operates in a framework of structural autonomy
characteristic of school boards in general. The city’s
school administration is in a state of transition from what
might be described as a patriarchal organization dominated
almost entirely by the superintendent, to a larger, more
complex system of bureaucracy. New Bedford’s teachers, like
others throughout the country, have become increasingly more
militant, and community leaders, in one instance, have de-
manded some form of institutionalized control over neighbor-
hood schools.
Despite possible similarities, or the lack of them,
between New Bedford and other urban school districts, gen-
eralizations based on a single study are rarely justified.
The importance of case studies such as this one lies rather
in the area of exploration. It is hoped that insights
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gained and phenomenon identified have suggested some fruit-
ful hypotheses for future studies. As Jacobs and Lipsky
point out: "Case study analysis may suggest new measures of
input, process and output for further comparative statistical
analysis...What we need are maps of the subsystems which are
responsible for output decisions in various subject areas.
The present investigation is aimed at describing and evalu-
ating educational politics in the area of personnel policy.
Findings are compared with existing literature by major
specialists of educational policymaking in order to provide
a better basis for analysis.
This report will focus on providing answers to questions
in three basic categories:
1) The actors involved. Which groups and individuals
were influential in educational decision making and in
particular in the formulation of personnel policy?' Which
individuals or groups sought to influence such policy, but
were unable to do so? Is their influence or activity limited
only to certain kinds of issues?
2) The decision making process. What institutions and
procedures are being used in the formulation of personnel
policy? Do these institutions benefit any particular group
or set of actors? Do they tend to exclude any particular
group or groups from participation in the decision making
process? When conflict arises, how is it dealt with? Do
those seeking to influence policy work through established
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channels or try to circumvent them? What resources and
sanctions are applied in decision making? Under what
circumstances are such sanctions and resources effective?
Are sanctions, decisions or procedures being used to sup-
press or sidetrack an issue? At what stage of the decision
making process do various actors become involved?
3) Analysis of policymaking. How do patterns of in-
fluence identified here differ from findings in other
studies? How might these differences be explained? Are
any changes in the decision making process taking place?
What hypotheses do answers to the above mentioned questions
suggest for future research?
The analysis, in part, is based on an investigation of
what appeared to be the most important decisions or issues
affecting school personnel policy in New Bedford over about
a two-year period (1970-1971). Some of these decisions will
be discussed in depth, others more superficially. Decisions
and issues were selected for study on the basis of: 1) whe-
ther or not they appeared to represent a challenge to the
resources of power, influence or authority of those actors
at the center of the decision making process, 2) the
perceptions of informants representing a number of diverse
interests on which decisions were "most important", and
3) their overall effect on policy output, patterns of in-
fluence and upon the decision making process.
Information about the New Bedford school system was drawn
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primarily from interviews and first hand observation.
School department, teachers’ union, State Department of
education, local Model Cities and parent association docu-
ments and reports and the local newspaper were used to
provide background material and supplementary evidence.
Informants were selected by their institutional positions
in government and organized interest groups and by casual
attributions of knowledge, influence and active participation
in a decision. Interviewees included members of the school
committee, the mayor, the superintendent of schools and
other top administrators, school principals, the head of
the teachers’ union, parent association presidents, city
council members, the city auditor, Model Cities officials,
black leoders active in education, the editor and reporters
at the local newspaper and PTA parents involved in certain
school decisions • Although complete coverage was not as-
sured by this approach, most points of view, hopefully,
were represented and many sources of information were
utilized.
The interviews were unstructured, though organized around
a basic set of inquiries. Before interviewing began, a list
of questions was devised and this served as a guide and check-
list for discussions with respondents. In particular, stan-
dard questions included open-ended ’’probes" as to who was
influential in education matters generally and in the
specific decision studied. In addition, respondents were
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asked to rate a list of individuals and groups as to their
influence in personnel policymaking. This list of possibly
influential actors was based on other studies of educational
decision making. Finally, detailed explanations were sought
as to the role of the various actors in an effort to recon-
struct the decision making process. Some additional actors
were identified in this manner and then were interviewed as
to their role in specific decisions. This procedure seemed
appropriate to the exploratory nature of the research, which
was designed to map cut decision making processes and exist-
ing or potential patterns of influence.
Basically, evidence will be grouped into four clusters of
variables
:
1) Socio-economic, demographic, cultural and historical
factors. These, in a loose term, will serve as independent
variables. In terms of their theoretical importance, such
factors may be thought of as the environment in which demands
on the educational system are generated and the conditions
which define the community T s capacity to support public ser-
vices •
2) Policy issues. These variables often define the
atmosphere under which decisions are made and provide the
stimulus which sets decision making in motion. The content
of issues, however, is also governed to some extent by the
nature of decision making institutions and processes and the
use of nondecision making.
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3) Decision making institutions, processes and actors.
These variables will be the focal point of this study, since
they determine and illustrate the manner in which influence
is brought to bear on policymaking. Although educational
institutions and decision making processes are our primary
concern, city government and state and federal institutions
will be discussed where pertinent.
4) Policy outputs. These variables will serve as a
guide in determining the extent of actual influence by
various actors on personnel policy. Decision outcomes could
in turn alter institutions and decision making processes.
Policy output may be seen as dependent on variables in the
first three categories. Policy outputs to be closely
scrutinized in this study of personnel decision making
include the creation and elimination of posts, hiring and
firing, use of patronage, salaries, personnel recruitment
and the formulation of job requirements.
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CHAPTER II
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES
The Community Setting
Before turning to a discussion of personnel decision
making in the New Bedford school system, a brief sketch of
the community setting is in order. The city’s educational
problems are to a large extent a product of its socio-
economic and historical characteristics. Political and
educational institutions have helped shape specific issues
developing from these problems. These socio-economic char-
acteristics and institutions, as they have a bearing on
education, will be described in this chapter to provide a
background for the detailed examination of personnel policy-
making.
New Bedford is the fourth largest city in Massachusetts
and the center of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
which includes the towns of Acushnet, Dartmouth, Fairhaven,
Marion and Mattapoisett
. It is located about 60 miles south
of Boston and some 30 miles east of Providence, Rhode Island,
at a point on the coast where the Acushnet River enters
Buzzards Bay. Stretching almost ten miles from north to
south along the west bank of the Acushnet River, the city is
only three miles across at its widest point. It covers an
area of 19 square miles. Founded in 1719, New Bedford was a
small farming village until the 1760’ s when Joseph Russell
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and Joseph Rotch began the development of the whaling in-
dustry. Shipbuilding followed whaling and together they
were responsible for making Mew Bedford the nation's chief
whaling port of 1820. The city’s rich heritage is still
reflected in a number of fine old buildings and in the varied
racial and cultural mix of its population.”^
Historically, New Bedford’s population has ebbed and
flowed in response to economic conditions. Whaling brought
economic success to the city. At the same time, it attracted
immigrants from various parts of the world, primarily from
Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands, a Portuguese colony in
the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of West Africa. Both Portu-
gal and the islands had strong seafaring traditions. Adverse
economic conditions at home encouraged many of these fisher-
men to remain in the New World.
The whaling industry began to decline after the discovery
of petroleum in Pennsylvania in 1357. However, the growth of
the cotton textile industry brought another economic boom
and another large influx of immigrants to New Bedford,
largely from Canada,- England and Portugal. The establishment
of the Wamsutta Mills in 1346 marked the opening of this new
phase of economic growth. New Bedford became a leading city
in the manufacture of fine cotton fabrics. The scope of
textile manufacturing operations was broadened and eventually
expanded to include finished-goods production. By about
1920, the city’s population had swelled to more than 120,000.
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Large mill owners and others who gained wealth and prominence
during this period formed a local aristocracy, replacing to
some extent the old shipbuilding and whaling families. Eco-
nomically, they were able to dictate wages and working con-
ditions to the largely immigrant work force. The political
influence of such wealthy families was also great and many
of their names are represented among the list of New Bedford
mayors during this period. 2
But economic prosperity did not last. The depression of
the 1930’s, coupled with increasing foreign competition in
the textile industry and the introduction of synthetics,
caused many of the city’s textile mills to close. Severe
unemployment resulted. As the textile mills moved south to
take advantage of lower wage rates, many Mew Bedford residents
began their own out-migration in search of better job oppor-
tunities. The city has never fully recovered from the col-
lapse of the textile economy. After the depression, its
population continued in an uneven decline until 1965, when
it reached a low of slightly more than 100,000.
Since 1965, however, the city’s population has grown, due
to a new wave of immigration from Portugal and the Portuguese
colonies, augmented by in-migration of Puerto Ricans. A
local census set the 1970 population at 104,000.^ This time
the increase in population was not due to economic prosperity,
but to a 1965 amendment to the U.S. Immigration Act liberal-
izing quotas for many of the poorer countries in Europe and
the eastern hemisphere. Middle-class whites continued to
leave the city for other areas or the nearby suburbs. At
the same time, the New Bedford Police Department estimated
7,000 to 3,000 Portuguese immigrated to New Bedford between
1065 and 1970. 4 The new immigrants from Portugal probably
came to New Bedford because it already had a sizeable Portu-
guese community. The continued out-migration of wealthy and
middle-class residents, combined with the influx of largely
poor and unskilled immigrants, created an abnormal popula-
tion shift, aggravating already adverse economic conditions
ano a low educational level and increasing demands on the
city T s educational and social institutions. School Depart-
ment officials reported that about 250 non—English speaking
students entered the system each year from 1965 to 1970.
During the same time period, the enrollment of English-
speaking students declined. Total public school enrollment
in 1970 was 16,575.
After World War II, politicians with ethnic and patronage-
based support slowly began to replace the old "swamp Yankee"
Republican whaling-textile elite as public officeholders.
The new public officeholders were at least nominal Democrats
and mostly of Irish stock. Economic leaders included bank-
ers and large property owners and the remaining local indus-
trialists. Small locally owned, garment manufacturing firms
and other marginal industries began to replace the large
textile companies as the city ! s economic base. The political
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influence of economic leaders became more informal, more
behind-the-scenes. Where effective, the influence of the
business community served to keep local taxes and public
services at a minimal level and to discourage the establish-
ment of new industries in the city in order to keep wages
among the lowest in the Mortheast. In 1971, average weekly
wages in "ew Bedford's manufacturing sector were $109.76,
compared with a state average of $5134.35. The fiscally con-
servative policies of successive city administrations during
the 1950’S and 1960's were also a result of public attitudes
created by high unemployment, a depressed economy, a dwind-
ling tax base and a generally low level of education. In
recent years, political leaders have relied on state and
federal grants, instead of local taxes, to meet pressing
needs in areas such as education and housing.'*
Today, Hew Bedford’s economy is still based on low-wage,
low-skill industries. These marginal firms hire large
numbers of women. In recent years, employers often have
been unable to fill .jobs, even though unemployment is high,
because the wages they offer are so low. Such employers rely
heavily on recent immigrants to supply the cheap labor they
seek. Nany of the city’s manufacturing jobs are also sea-
sonal, forcing many workers to count on periodic unemploy-
ment benefits as part of their regular income.^1 New Bedford
is one of the major fishing and scallop ports in the North-
east, but fishermen account for less than three percent of
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- Fish Pressing plants employ a sizeable
work force, but the garment industry is by far the largest
employer in Pew Bedford. Textile firms rank next in number
of employees
,
then electrical machinery, rubber products and
food products. According to the Massachusetts Division of
Employment Security, an average of 42,066 persons were em-
ployed in the city in 1970. About 58 percent of them were
engagea in manufacturing. The state average for this sector
was 37.4 percent in 1970—indicating a major lack of diver-
sity in New Bedford T s labor force skills.
Table 1. Industrial Categories of Employed Persons,in Percent, as Reported to the Massachusetts
Division of Employment Security, 1970.
Industrial Category Percent
Agriculture
,
fishing and mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, communication and utilities
Wholesale
-retail trade
Finance, insurance and real estate
Service industries
2.5
3.1
57.9
3.3
21.1
3.2
3.4
By 1970 statistics, the city had 121 wholesale firms,
employing an average of 1,542 persons with an average payroll
of '310,192,695. Retail shops numbered 713, employed an
average of 7,322 persons and had an annual payroll of
343,445,445. New Bedford had 243 manufacturing establish-
ments in 1970 with an annual payroll of $143,323,122 and
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employed an average of 24,343 persons. Of the dozen or so
firms in the city employing 500 persons or more, most were
nationally owned subsidiaries. Locally owned firms were
rather small for the most part, but relatively numerous.
As previously noted, the city’s economy is dominated by
low-wage, low-skill industries. The Massachusetts Division
of Employment Security reported for June 1971, average weekly
wages for the manufacturing sector in New Bedford were
$1 09 .79 * while the state average was $134.35. Average hourly
earnings for the same period in manufacturing were $2.92
for New Bedford, compared with a state average of $3.41.
The most telling figure is the city’s unemployment rate,
which averaged $.$ percent in 1970. Unemployment in the
state for 1970 averaged 5.2 percent and nationally, it was
4.9 percent. Massachus etts Division of Employment Security
figures indicated that New Bedford has, for the past ten
years, had a considerably higher unemployment rate than the
state or country as a whole. The U.S. Department of Labor
gives New Bedford a ”D” classification as one of the 20
U.S. cities with persistently high unemployment
Table 3 on occupation distribution gives some indication
of the economic and class structure of New Bedford. A report
by the Massachusetts Office of Planning and Coordination for
1969 states that New Bedford would be severely jeopardized
in attempts to attract high-skill
,
high-paying industry to
the city because of the low percentage of managerial and
professional personnel in its labor force. In addition, the
Table
2.
Manufacturing
Firms,
Employees
and
Payrolls,
by
Industry,
as
Reported
to
the
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Division
of
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general level of education in the city is very low. Ac-
cording to the 1970 U. S. Census, the median number of years
completed by persons 25 years old and over in New Bedford
was 3.0 years— the lowest in the nation for all cities with
populations over 100,000. The state median for 1970 was
12.2. The 1969 Massachusetts Office of Planning and Co-
ordination report also notes that "modern, technologically
sophisticated industries usually require a median educational
level of 11.7 years in order to build new facilities in an
area.”
^
Table 3. Occupational
Bureau,
Categories, 1970,
in percent
U.S. Census
Category New Bedford Massachusetts
Professionals 8.9 17.4
Managers and proprietors 5.0 3.6
Clerical and sales 19.1 26.9
Craftsmen and foremen 12.3 13.1
Operatives 36.3 17.6
Service workers 11.9 12.5
Laborers 6.0 4.9
During the case study period, a severe housing shortage
added to the social tension and unrest created by high
unemployment. The New Bedford Police Department estimated
that the vacancy rate for standard housing units was about
1.5 percent in 1970, compared with five percent regarded
the necessary rate by the U.S. Department of Housing and
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Urban Development as necessary for flexibility in the hous-
ing market. The housing crisis was aggravated by the fact
that urban renewal programs had eliminated a substantial
amount of substandard, but occupied, housing without corres-
ponding replacement in many cases. The burden of the hous-
ing shortage fell most heavily on poor and nonwhite residents.
Since 1972, the severe shortage of low-income housing has
been relieved by the completion of several large public
housing projects.
New Bedford’s economic problems certainly are not new—
they have persisted since the textile industry moved south
after World bar II. The city can be described as in a
transition phase from a single industry economy to one with
a more stable and diversified base. This phase, however,
has been long and painful as it has been in other former mill
towns in the Northeast. In New Bedford, the point of econo-
mic slowdown, as others have in the past, has already hit
New Bedford that much harder. Large scale urban renewal
projects in the city are still in the process of completion
and their effect cannot be assessed. However, many city
leaders have suggested an improvement in vocational skills
among the labor force and in the city’s general educational
level is a prerequisite to any economic progress.*^ Some
efforts have been made in that direction and will be described
below. As in other urban areas, however, education must com-
pete with other pressing needs for limited local tax re-
sources (mostly the property tax). In addition, the property
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tax base is dwindling rather than the reverse, as industries
move to the suburbs or to other areas where demands on local
government are lighter, total tax resources are greater and
taxes lower. In 1966, the state Division of Employment
Security reported 2,401 businesses and firms in New Bedford.
By 1970, the number was 2,343. During the same period,
every suburban community in the New Bedford SUSA added to
its total of firms and businesses.*^
Lost of the economic and social woes that plagued New
Bedford residents as a whole were magnified for the 11-12
percent of its population that was nonwhite. In 1970, the
unemployment rate for nonwhites was nearly 18 percent—or
twice as much as for the white population.^ Nonwhites also
had generally lower incomes that whites, lower educational
levels in many cases and suffered more from the housing
shortage. According to the Massachusetts Division of Em-
ployment Security, New Bedford’s minority population in
1970 included about 7,400 Cape Verdeans, some 2,700 Afro-
Americans and about 1,900 Puerto Ricans. For the same
year, 40 percent of the population was of Portuguese stock,
22.8 percent of Canadian extraction, 12.7 percent British,
6.6 percent Polish and 2.8 percent Irish. An additional
17.8 percent was foreign born. Of the city’s black popu-
lation, Cape Verdeans were concentrated in what is known as
the city’s ’’South End” and Afro-Americans in the ’’West End.”
A unique situation has developed in New Bedford in that
46
many Cape Verdeans have traditionally identified themselves
as Portuguese rather than black. The resulting animosity
between Cape Verdeans and Afro-Americans has been encour-
aged to some extent by whites in the past. However, in-
creasing sensitivity to civil rights issues and the growth
of black pride has created an identity crisis for some Cape
Verdeans. In recent years, however, leaders in both commun-
ities have been relatively successful in unifying the two
groups in an effort to improve the political and socio-
economic status of all black residents of the city.
Puerto Ricans began arriving in the city only in recent
years. In some cases, they have joined with the black
leaders m pressing for better economic and social conditions
for all minorities. In many cases, however, the Puerto
Rican community has been neglected by all other interests.
Their present plight is probably worse than any other group
in the city, in part due to their small numbers, cultural
differences and a language barrier.
Racial tension has been a major concern of the city only
in recent years as nonwhite minorities have expressed dis-
content with inferior housing, inadequate education and re-
stricted economic opportunities. In the summer of 1970,
racial violence erupted in many smaller U.S. cities, includ-
ing New Bedford. The sporadic sniping and the wave of fires
which swept the South and h'est Ends for several weeks were
set off by an incident in which three white youths shot in-
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discriminately from their oar while driving through a
black neighborhood, killing a black youth and wounding
several others. The immediate result was rigid polariza-
tion between blacks and whites. A number of programs to
improve housing, education and recreation in black neighbor-
hoods were hastily organized. However, relations between
city officials and the black community have remained very
uneasy. In terms of education, blacks were able to capital-
ize on unity and their recent prominence to gain at least
a few more benefits from the system, if not political power.
As might be expected by its ethnic makeup, Hew Bedford is
overwhelmingly Catholic. One indication of the size of the
Catholic population is parochial school enrollment. According
to the Hew Bedford School Department, total public school
enrollment in 1970 was 16,575, while Catholic school enroll-
ment for the same year was 4,634, or roughly one-fourth of
those attending public school. The number of Catholic school
students has gradually declined since 1963 due to the closing
of a number of schools because of financial difficulties, not
lack of pupils who wished to attend. Certainly many Catholic
parents send their children to public schools either by
choice or because they cannot afford tuition. Precise fig-
ures on religious preferences in the city are not available,
but it is safe to assume that a sizeable majority of the
population is Roman Catholic. Religion, like race and ethnic
group, is often a more or less unspoken factor in city poli-
tics. The Catholic church has never officially attempted
to influence public administration or politics in the city,
and there seems to be little evidence that it has done so
unofficially. Nevertheless, public attitudes and alleg-
iances of this nature undoubtedly spill over into the polit-
ical and educational systems.
In terms of political institutions, the city has a mayor—
council form of government. The mayor, the six ward coun-
cillors (one for each ward) and five at-large councillors
are elected to two-year terms. The mayor is by law head of
the fire and police departments and is a member ex-officio
of various other boards, including the school committee. He
appoints all heads of departments and members of municipal
boards, except the school committee, officials appointed by
the governor and the assessors. Under the ’’weak mayor"
structure provided by the standard Massachusetts Plan B
charter adopted by the city in 1938, all such appointments
are subject to city council approval, with a few exceptions.
The council may override the mayor’s veto of any ordinance by
a two-thirds vote, and reduce or reject the mayor’s budget
(except for the portion allotted to schools) by a majority
vote. The council may not increase the budget or add items
to it. Municipal offices filled by election are those of
the mayor, city council, assessors and school committee.
Municipal elections are nonpartisan. In state and national
elections, the city’s electorate usually votes heavily Demo-
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cratic. The mayor and the vast majority of other elected
Oi i icials have traditionally been Democrats since the late
1 940’ s . Of 50,11? registered voters in 1970, 54.2 percent
were enrolled as Democrats, 13.4 percent were Republicans
and 27.4 percent were Independents. State figures for the
same year were Democratic at 43.2 percent, Republicans 20.3
percent and Independents 36.0 percent. The city’s sizeable
labor movement is the backbone of the local Democratic partv,
and plays a major role in state and national elections.
Leadership of the local Republican party is drawn from
members of the business and professional community. Muni-
cipal elections usually offer a choice between internal
factions of the local Democratic Party. At times, they are
simply a contest of personalities.
In sum, the picture of New Bedford that emerges is bleak.
Obviously, a severe strain has been put on the city’s social,
economic and educational systems by the combined efforts of
a persistently poor economy with its lov; wage rates, seasonal
layoffs and generally high unemployment. A dwindling tax
base, racial friction, the flight to the suburbs of middle-
class whites and the unanticipated influx of large numbers
of non-English speaking immigrants. There is, of course,
no simple solution to these problems. City leaders feel
modern, sophisticated industry must be attracted to the city
as soon as possible. Some leaders say school facilities
and educational programs are one key to achieving that goal.
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However, the city’s scarce resources are already heavily
taxed and probably inadequate to support the massive improve-
ments needed to bring about a reversal in the present cycle
of poverty. The regressive nature of the property tax makes
it an unfair and unpopular tool for raising the needed rev-
enue. Real change in New Bedford, as in many other decaying
urban areas, will probably require u. a Stic changes in present
institutions (regional government, for example) and current
tax structures.
b'ith this background in mind, we now turn to a description
of the city's school system and the specific problems it
faced in 1969 and 1970.
The Educational Setting
school committees in Massachusetts were established by
state law in 1326. They act as agents of the state and
are legally responsible for the operation of public schools.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has always asserted
ohat the field of public education is a separate statutory
domain. Except in the case of Boston, school committees have
enjoyed complete legal and fiscal independence. By law, a
city council or town meeting is required to appropriate a
"sufficient’* amount of money for the support of public
schools as requested by the school committee. State courts
have consistently interpreted this law to mean that school
operating budgets, once approved by the school committee,
must be incorporated intact in city or town expenditures for
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the vear. In rare instances where city councils or town
meetings have attempted to veto, reduce or change school
budgets in any way, they have been overruled and even
penalized by the courts. Capital expenditures requiring
school bond issues are an exception. Pond issues must be
apr-roved by ^he city council as well as the city council
or town meeting. 12
New Bedford’s public high school, three junior high
schools and 27 elementary schools are under the exclusive
jurisdiction of a six-member school committee, elected from
the city at large. The committee, in fact, has seven
members, since the mayor serves as chairman ex-officio in
all T-iassachusetts cities with a mayor-council form of
government except Boston. Three of the committee members
are chosen at each biennial city election for four—year
terms. They serve without pay. Regular committee meetings
are normally held bi-monthly and by state law are open to the
public. Closed sessions may be held when, in the committee’s
judgment, matters to be discussed might jeopardise the in-
terests of the community or harm the reputation of an
individual. 1 ^
Under a unique state statute, the city’s vocational high
school is operated by an independent board of trustees
appointed by the mayor with city council approval. Enroll-
ment in this school has remained at about $00 for the past
few years due to space limitations. However, in 1970, the
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city entered into an agreement with the towns of Fairhaven
and Dartmouth to build a 2
, 500 pupil regional vocational
high school. The new school is scheduled to open in Septem-
ber 1977. The city receives 50 percent reimbursement from
the state for the school's net operating budget. Because of
its separate and unique position, the vocational school will
not be included in the present discussion of New Bedford
schools
.
A superintendent, elected by the school committee, serves
as administrative head of the School Department. His salary
was $24,730 in 1970, while the mayor was paid $20,000 that
year. By state law, the school committee may not approve
an appointment, textbook or program unless it has been
recommended officially by the superintendent. He is also
responsible for the formulation of policies, plans and pro-
cedures for consideration by the committee; implementation
of approved policies, and preparation of the budget.
As of September 1970, the top administration was expanded
to include a deputy superintendent and four assistant super-
intendents in charge of business, personnel, curriculum and
special services. The department had previously employed
two assistant superintendents, one for elementary education
and one for secondary. The administrative reorganization
was approved by the school committee shortly after a new
mayor and a largely new school board took office, and after
years of inaction despite repeated requests by the superin-
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tendent. There was an obvious need for the expansion given
the size and diversity of the school system. The two pre-
vious assistant superintendents had been handpicked by, and
v;ere thoroughly loyal to, the superintendent. Their respon-
sibilities were almost completely limited to curriculum
matters. Shortly before the reorganization took place, one
of the previous assistant superintendents died and the other
retired. Thus, a virtual turnover in top administration
took place during this period. As a result, power and in-
fluence within the department was in a state of transition
at the time of this study as the new administrators sought
to establish their own spheres of influence. The superin-
tendent’s former patriarchal domination of internal policy
had come under fire.
Public school enrollment in Hew Bedford in 1970 was
16
,
575
,
including over 300 vocational high school students.
Enrollment at the high school was about 2,500, about 3,200
at the junior high school level and about 10,000 in ele-
mentary schools. There were 642 classroom teachers in the
system— 102 at the high school, 157 in the three junior
high schools and 3#3 in elementary schools. During the
period studied, the number of classroom teachers was not
significantly increased over previous years. However, a
number of guidance counselors and specialists in areas
such as reading, music and bilingual education were added
to the staff.
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1970, minority students—Afro-Americans, Cape Verdeans
and Puerto Ricans-made up about 15 percent of the total
enrollment. However, there were only three nonwhite admini-
strators and four nonwhite teachers in the entire school
system at the time this case study begins.
- urinf the fall of 1968, the public school system's
official pupil-teacher ratio was 24.8 for elementary schools
and 25.6 for secondary schools. Both figures are slightly
higher than the state average, according to the school
superintendent. The president of the teachers’ union said
the figures did not reflect average class size, which was
much larger, because they averaged in specialists who moved
from class to class, as well as very small classes for
special students such as the handicapped. The superintendent
also reported that teacher turnover for that year was 10 to
11 percent, or somewhat less than the state average.
Money to support public schools is obtained to a large
extent from local property taxes. While state and federal
contributions to local schools have increased in recent
years, Massachusetts towns and cities must assume a greater
portion of the tax burden than in many other states. In
1970, the local share of total revenues for public schools
averaged 70.7 percent in Massachusetts while the U.S.
average was 51.9 percent. The average state contribution
to local schools in Massachusetts was 22.4 percent, while
the national average for state spending was 40.9 percent.
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ederal funding in the state was only slightly below the
national average. 15 ln i 969
,
total school expenses in
NeW "sdford Were $8
-«3.292. Of that, $5,979,503 ca.e from
city taxes.
The regressive nature of the property tax and the practice
of unequal assessment, which is widespread in the state,
weigh heavily on communities such as New Bedford. At present,
many well-to-do school districts in the state have a per
pupil expenditure double that of poor communities. At the
same time, the tax rate in a wealthy district may be half
the rate in the less advantaged city or town. The system
of state aid is designed to alleviate such inequities. How-
ever, the present system falls far short of real needs.
According to the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the
school tax rate in New Bedford for 1969 ranked 26th among
52 school systems in the state with enrollments of 6,000 or
more. The city T s per pupil expenditure for the same year
was o55
/
placing it 50th among the same 52 school systems.
Despite New Bedford r s limited resources, its 1970 school
budget marked a sizable increase over the previous year.
The 1970 per pupil expenditure was $779, or 31st among the
52 school systems with which it is compared by the MTA.
The state median per pupil expenditure for 1970 was $302
among the same group of school districts. Most of the
increase went toward increased teachers T salaries and addi-
tional personnel. The minimum teacher’s salary in 1969 was
56
«as $6,400, compared with $7,000 in 1970. The state median
mlnimU“ S3lary Was *7
-
100 ^ 1970 for school districts with
enrolments of 6,000 or more. In 1971, the city-s school
tax rate was 21st of the 52 districts.
ihis increase in educational expenditures may in part
be attributed to th* election ^oik. of a new mayor and four new
school committee members in November 1969. (One of the
committee members was elected to fill a vacancy created by
death.) The mayor, a state representative and chairman of
the education committee in the state House of Representatives,
had campaigned on a platform which included vast improve-
ments in city schools. The four new committee members in-
cluded a former teacher, a college professor, a social
worker and an attorney, well known for his liberal political
views. The old committee, including the two members who re-
mained in office, had pursued a policy of fiscal conserva-
tism wherever possible. Many of its members had been in
office for more than a decade.
In September 1969, the New Bedford Educators' Associ-
ation (the local teachers T union) staged a successful strike
which lasted two weeks and ended in a court settlement plac-
ing equal blame for the dispute on the union and the school
committee. Negotiations prior to and during the strike were
marked by bitter conflict between the union and committee.
The local newspaper gave wide coverage to the debate which
centered not only on wages, but to a large extent, on issues
5 ?
such as overcrowded classrooms, lack of educational facil-ities and materials and the need for trained specialists.
-jnion received a good deal of public support, expressed
on radio talk shows, in letters tn fv,' ' 0 the newspaper and through
civic and parents’ organizations. hany persons interviewed
& this research expressed the view that the strike may
have contributed to a change in the complexion of the school
committee by drawing attention to conditions in the schools.
At the time of this case study, the New Bedford school
system was beset by a number of urgent educational needs
and demands. One of the more obvious-the drastic need for
new school construction-** mostly the result of long-tenn
neglect. A professional survey of New Bedford school facil-
ities in 1971 indicated that nearly half of the city's
existing school buildings dated back to the turn of the
century and should be replaced. The survey noted that most
of these buildings were functionally inadequate in terms of
modern educational needs and that many failed to meet health
° n " saf5t l standards. Acoustics, electrical wiring, plumbing
and the general state of repair is poor in older facilities,
the survey said. In addition, the vast majority of city
schools, including many newer buildings, lacked library space,
cafeterias and gymnasiums.^
Overcrowding added to the need for new construction. At
time oi the 1971 survey, 31 portable classrooms were in
use. In some schools, classes were being held in storage
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spaces and lounges. Immigration, parochial school closings
and population shifts within the city had precipitated a
near—crisis situation, the survey said.^ ; Fo schools were
constructed in the city between 1927 and 1957. From 1957 to
1970, four elementary schools and a junior high school were
completed. Construction of a new high school, launched in
1970, did not open until after the case study period—in
September 1972. The 3,000 to 4,000 pupil structure is
designed to meet many of the city’s special educational
needs.
Another major concern of school officials was compliance
with the state Racial Imbalance Act of 1965. Under this act,
the state Board of Education was empowered to withhold all
state funds from communities in which one or more schools
had an enrollment of more than 50 percent nonwhite students,
if such action was necessary to bring about compliance with
the law. In 1970, three Few Bedford elementary schools were
in violation of the act, despite a voluntary busing program
which consisted mainly of busing nonwhite students to pre-
dominately white schools. The racially imbalanced Greene
School in the city’s South End had also instituted "reverse
busing programs" in which a number of white students volun-
teered to be bused to the predominately nonwhite school.
Because of city housing patterns, most observers felt that
long-term compliance with this law would require the con-
struction of critically located new schools as well as con-
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tinued busing and redistricting of school boundaries. The
1965 act also included a provision for 65 percent state re-
imbursement on the cost of construction, as opposed to the
normal 40 percent, on any school which reduced racial in,-
balance.
A third concern was the impending closure of many paro-
chial schools in the city, part of a national trend attri-
butable to financial difficulties. Parochial school enroll-
ments, which made up about 20 percent of the total school
population m 1970, had been reduced by about 25 percent
since 1 q63
,
and five schools had closed during this time.
The 1971 survey suggested that as many as one
-third of the
city’s 14 remaining parochial schools might be forced to
close within the next few years.
^
In addition to these urgent problems, a number of special
educational needs existed within the city. They included
the need for special language and cultural programs to
assist the large number of non-English speaking students
that had entered the system each year since 1965. In many
cases, the language barrier was further complicated by the
fact that the parents of such students were illiterate in
their native tongue. During the 1070-1971 school year,
monies received under the federal Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) were used to meet a large
portion of costs for a non-English speaking and bilingual
education program. In September 1971, a new state law took
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* ff*Ct Which re<luires any school district with 20 or more
non-English speaking students to provide transitional bi-
lingual education. All costs beyond the district's basic
per pupil expenditure are reimbursed by the state. Ne„
Bedford was able to comply with the new law without great
difficulty because it already had an extensive program for
non-English speaking students. After 1971, however, ESSA
monies were no longer available for these programs. The
city picked up costs not provided by the state.
The high dropout rate for public school students in New
Bedford was another source of major concern for city offi-
cials. According to State Department figures, the dropout
rate was 23 percent in grades 9-12 for 1970. Because of
the city’s low wage level, many students— especially in
poverty areas— felt compelled to leave school at age 16
to supplement the family income. This problem was especi-
ally acute among immigrants. Facilities at the new high
school have made it possible to offer a variety of educa-
tional courses aimed at persuading the potential dropout
to stay in school. The new curriculum and a variety of
other measures adopted since September 1972 (when a super-
intendent from outside the system was hired) apparently
have been somewhat effective. The dropout rate for 1974 was
16 percent for grades 9-12.
During the case study period, the school system relied
heavily on federal antipoverty program funding to meet
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many of the educational needs created by socio-economic
conditions m the city. Federal monies were used to fi-
nance a free breakfast and lunch program in some schools,
special curriculum development and in-service teacher
training, additional teacher aides to provide more person-
alized attention for '’educationally deprived TT students, and
a number of other compensatory education programs.
The socio-economic, demographic, cultural and historical
characteristics of New Bedford described in this chapter
are the raw materials for important policy issues in the
area of education. The decision making institutions des-
cribed here and in the following chapters help to shape the
manner in which such issues are raised, and at times deter-
mine whether they are ever raised publicly at all. The next
chapter will describe the various groups and individuals
that emerged from this background as active participants in
the educational decision making process. During the case
study period, patterns of influence were changing and many
new forces were at work. The next chapter will also discuss
the degree of influence various actors, both recent and
traditional, were able to wield in the arena of educational
politics.
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CHAPTER HI
THE CAST
In any school system, the potential participants in the
policymaking process are essentially the same, legal powers
are generally divided between the board of education (called
"the school committee" in Massachusetts ) and the superin-
tendent. In Mew Bedford and other Massachusetts cities ex-
cept Boston, the mayor is ex-officio chairman of the school
corr.rr.ittee in addition to his other duties. City Council
approval is required on bond issues for school projects,
generally construction, although the council has no author-
ity in other budget matters. The bureaucracy, as separate
from the superintendent, typically has a major role in
policymaking. It may be divided roughly into central ad-
ministrators and field supervisers. These groups and in-
dividuals have direct access to the decision making arena.
Teachers and teacher organizations are also important po-
tential participants. Through collective bargaining and
union contracts, they may have a formal role in some areas
of policy. Parent associations and other specialized edu-
cation interest groups have been active at times in some
communities. Their role is usually sporadic and supportive
of the administration.
In the general community there are other potential parti-
cipants. They are federal, state and local officials other
than the mayor
;
civic and "good government" groups such as
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the League of Woman Voters; business leaders and organiza-
tions representing them; the press; organized labor; civil
rights and similar organizations, and religious leaders.
Interrelationships between these potential participants,
the relative power or lack of it of each, and their role
m particular decisions, differs with the nature of issues
and the political, economic and social environment of the
-|
school system.
The School Committee
The six-member hew Bedford School Committee (seven
including the mayor) has predominately been made up of
fiscally conservative members of the business and profess-
ional community for at least the last 15 years. Most de-
ferred to the superintendent in matters that did not affect
taxes, based on the publically stated philosophy that edu-
cation policy should be left to the professionals.^ Elec-
tions were quiet and incumbents were automatically returned
to office by wide margins. The complexion of the committee,
however, had changed dramatically at the time of this case
study (1970-1971). Four new members and a new mayor were
elected the previous November. All five of the new offic-
ials had campaigned vigorously on platforms that included
better working conditions for teachers and increased finan-
cial support for the schools. An incumbent was defeated in
the election for the first time since the turn of the Gen-
'S
tury.-' He had been in office for 28 years. Nearly all of
the previous committee members had been in office at least
15 years. Two of the veterans remained in office to com-
plete their four-year terms. A third died shortly before
the election. Of the three whose terms expired at the end
of 1 69
,
two announced they would not run again. Both an-
nounced their retirement a few days before the end of an
eight-day teachers’ strike in September 1969. Of 20 re-
spondents who answered the question, 12 attributed the two
resignations and the incumbent defeat to events surrounding
the strike. Five interviewees would not answer this ques-
tion. The strike generated a great deal of publicity and
focused attention on many educational, rather than salary,
issues such as the need for better curriculum development,
more teachers and smaller classes.^ The city’s only news-
paper (normally Republican and anti-labor ) editorially
criticized the school committee for footdragging in con-
tract negotiations and dishonesty in its dealings with the
teachers, while deploring the "illegal” strike. 5 Negotia-
tions for the union’s second contract had been in progress
for over two years before the strike. In a suit brought by
the committee involving the illegality of the strike, the
court divided responsibility between the school committee and
the union and ordered the City to bear half the cost of the
walkout. The union paid the other half.^
Of the new committee members, two were educators (a col-
lege professor and a teacher in another school system)
,
one
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was a social worker and one an attorney who was active in
civil rights organizations. The two educators were strongly
supported by the teachers' union in the campaign. The new
mayor supported all four new members and provided substantial
campaign assistance to the teacher. The teacher and the
social worker had never run for office before. The professor
and the attorney both ran for a committee seat in 1967. At
that time, the attorney lost by only 23 votes. Counsel to
several labor unions and the local HAACP, he was endorsed in
the campaign by the Mew Bedford area AFL-CIO council and was
supported by the black community. Only two of the 1970
committee members were extensively involved in politics out-
side the school committee. One of the remaining veterans,
a dentist, was head of the Republican Party in New Bedford,
head of the State Racing Commission, and influential in
choosing patronage appointees by the Republican governor.
The other veteran was the wife of an attorney. The liberal
attorney was heavily involved in the local Democratic Party.
In interviews, new members of the committee said they favored
widespread community participation in educational policy-
making.
In terms of its actual influence in educational policy,
the new committee as a whole assumed more of a leadership
role than in the past, but was hamstrung in most areas by
traditional lack of information, time and staff. Including
the mayor, a former teacher and state legislator who served
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as chairman of the House of Representatives education com-
mittee, there were five votes for change on the committee.
On several occasions, led by the mayor or the liberal
attorney, the committee made decisions on personnel policy
and curriculum (usually considered internal matters) that
were opposed by the superintendent. But this only happened
sooradically and nearly always after a great deal of com-
munity pressure was brought to bear. Under the pre-1970
committee, community pressures in opposition to the super-
intendent were invariably ignored. However, in most cases,
the committee could offer no alternatives to those proposed
by the superintendent or his administration. Comments by
committee members interviewed are illustrative: "The super-
intendent runs the department on a day-to-day basis; we
just get involved at meetings (of the committee). If he
doesn’t think he can get something through the committee,
he just does it anyway and doesn’t tell us." nThe superin-
tendent sends us a huge agenda a few days before the meeting.
We barely have time to read it, much less suggest something
else." The committee members who did show some initiative
were those with a political base outside the school board
—
the mayor, the liberal attorney and "Mr. Republican."
In the area of integration, however, the committee’s
influence was pronounced, although negative in nature. As
one of the veteran members commented, "The committee goes
along with the mayor on the budget because the tax rate
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reflects on him,
bers personally,
the case study,
but integration reflects on committee mem-
Ve have to get involved." At the time of
the committee was under heavy pressure from
officials to integrate three elementary schools that
were in violation of the state Racial Imbalance Act. The
law prohibits more than 50 percent nonwhite enrollment in
any public school and empowers state officials to withhold
state aid, if necessary, to enforce the law. Most inter-
viewees from the community-at-large credited the school ad-
ministration, state officials and local civil rights organi-
zations with influence in integration matters. In fact, the
committee would have done little, if anything, about inte-
gration without state pressure. A liberal member of the
committee admitted he had hoped the state would design and
impose a_desegregation plan to insulate the school board from
white community pressure. The details of an integration plan
were left to school administrators. However, when forced to
act a week before a state deadline for an acceptable plan,
the committee rejected four alternative plans drawn up by the
administration with input from some black leaders. All four
involved forced busing of whites. The committee then ordered
the administration to come up with a plan that did not involve
n
forced busing. The committee clearly drew the line at alien-
ation of white parents through either massive redistricting
(another alternative rejected by the committee) or forced
busing. The situation was finally resolved when a 350-pupil
school in a white neighborhood was burned to the ground and
its former pupils were sent to other schools, including the
predominantly black one. The Mew Bedford Fire Department
said arson was involved.
Nearly all respondents, including school committee members
said the board was not very influential in budget, curricu-
lun or capital projects.
Concerning personnel policy, nine out of 22 respondents
said the school committee was highly influential, ten said
it was somewhat influential and three said it was not very
influential. Under Massachusetts law, the school committee
can only appoint persons who have been nominated by the super
intend ent. At the time of this case study, the committee’s
influence in personnel (or that of individual members) was
different for each of three categories: nonprofessional
staff not covered by Civil Service provisions (teacher aides,
temporary help, and new posts for which a Civil Service list
had not yet been established); teachers and administrators
(principals up). Committee members were often successful in
influencing nonprofessional appointments for political
(patronage) or personal (friendship) reasons. They were
only occasionally abl<* to influence teacher appointments.
Those members with strong outside political ties (the mayor,
"Mr. Republican” and the liberal attorney) were most persis-
tent in attempts to influence nonprofessional and (less fre-
quently) teacher appointments. Even so, the committee did
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not interview teachers and only attempted to interfere when
they had a particular candidate in mind. Most were selected
by the administration. Only on very rare occasions did the
committee attempt to influence the selection of administra-
tors for political reasons, although this did happen at least
once during the case study. Mot only was the superintendent
more adamant about his independence in this area, but as one
committee member explained: "The committee feels it’s bad
policy to bring in politics at that level.'* On the other
hand, the committee interviewed candidates for principal
and the superintendent usually polled the committee before
making his nomination public to make sure he had the necess-
ary votes. As individuals, committee members may have in-
fluenced the superintendent on administrative appointments.
One of the veteran members noted: "A committee member can
be influential if he or she goes to the superintendent alone
and persuades him. But unless we have very good reasons, as
v/ell as the votes needed to oppose the superintendent (on
administrative appointments), we go along. n Resources con-
tributing to actual influence by individual members were
longevity in office; thus, greater knowledge of the system
and the staff; control of other votes on the committee; and
past support or the promise of future support of the superin-
tendent on other issues. In most cases, administrators were
handpicked by the superintendent from within the system. At
times the committee influenced general policy, as in one case,
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it suggested the superintendent look outside the system for
an assistant superintendent. On a few occasions, the selec-
tion of administrators involved a tug of war among the super-
intendent, the committee and the mayor, with "deals" being
made by various factions to support one of the superinten-
dent's candidates in return for his concession on another.
The superintendent almost undoubtedly would have refused to
nominate a candidate with whom he had major differences.
The Mayor
The mayor who took office when this case study begins
displayed a somewhat unique interest in the area of educa-
tion. His campaign platform, like the platforms of the new
school committee members, included improvement and increased
financial support for city schools. Although the incumbent
did not run against him, the new mayor had considerable grass
roots support, including liberals, the black communit}'’ and
organized labor, especially the teachers 1 union and other
municipal employees’ unions (these unions, along with the
teachers, had been involved in bitter contract negotiations
with the previous administration). The mayor was elected by
a wide margin and voter turnout was larger than, usual for
a city election (71 percent of the registered voters on a
rainy day).^ The Hew Bedford Election Commission said 55-60
percent would have been normal voter turnout.
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Of 23 persons who answered the question, 12 (including
the superintendent) said the mayor was one of the most in-
fluential leaders in education generally. In fact, his in-
fluence or lack of it was about the same as the most active
members of the school committee in many areas. The budget
was a major exception. Members of the school committee who
were interviewed, the superintendent and the previous mayor,
al] commented that not only the new mayor, but any mayor,
had decisive influence in determining the size of the budget.
One committee member noted, "He has the political contacts
and he has the most to lose politically since he is respons-
ible for the tax rate." The size of the budget alone, how-
ever, had a major impact on the entire system in Mew Bedford.
In the past, mayors had used their influence to keep the
budget as low as possible. The previous mayor explained his
reasoning in this regard: "People in New Bedford aren’t
education-oriented. You get no political points for spending
money on education. Besides, the property tax is hardest on
those who can least afford to pay it—the small homeowner and
tenants (because rents go up when taxes go up)." As a result
of such policies, the school system offered some of the low-
est salaries in the state and the per pupil cost was 50th of
52 systems with enrollment of 6,000 or more. In the area of
personnel, this meant, as one school administrator remarked,
"Even if we had tried to attract staff members from outside
the system, it probably would have been almost impossible."
The new mayor said he felt the voters wanted, and were
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willing to pay for better education. In addition, he said
he hoped to offset increased expenditures by encouraging new
construction and attracting new industry to the city. Through
his influence, sizable increases in the school budget were
aporoved for 1970 and 1971. Almost all of the new funds were
used for salary increases for teachers and other staff and
to create new posts, including a new deputy superintendent
and two new assistant superintendents. In addition to his
influence over budget size, the mayor may have had some in-
fluence over budget content in so far as he was responsible
for providing additional funds. The administration, however,
was most influential in this area. In the past, mayors had
left budget content almost entirely up to the superintendent
and his staff, forcing the administration to decide where to
make unpopular cuts. The new mayor also personally took
charge of contract negotiations with the school department
employees 1 unions. Besides salary increases for teachers
both years he was in office, the mayor agreed to two teacher
demands that had been steadfastly denied by the previous ad-
ministration. These were a grievance procedure with binding
arbitration and a mandatory "agency fee" to be paid for union
services by teachers who were not union members. The mayor
also agreed to provisions that increased teacher participa-
tion in curriculum development and strengthened seniority in
voluntary transfers and promotions. He also negotiated
items providing for increased principal participation in the
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selection of teachers for their own schools. (Principals
were included in the union.) Negotiations under the pre-
vious mayor which led to the strike were more of a collec-
tive effort by the school committee, but the previous mayor
was probably just as influential as the new mayor in money
matters. A teachers' union official remarked that the pre-
vious mayor had not attended contract negotiations or budget
hearings on a regular basis, "but he could just as well have
been there, "hen it comes to money, any mayor has an im-
portant say and rakes sure he knows what T s going on.™
Although two other school committee members had extensive
outside political ties, the mayor, because of his influence
in budget and taxes, was the key link between the school
system and the political and economic system of the city as
a whole at the time of this case study. As such, he was
subject to many pressure groups besides those normally asso-
ciated with education. He may, in fact, have been simply
serving the interests of other influentials. Since this
case study does not examine in detail the general power
structure of the community-at-large or decision making in
areas other than education, no definite conclusions can be
drawn about the influence, for example, of economic leaders
in the area of taxes and thus, indirectly, in education#
The mayor suggested that "over the years, city administra-
tions have forced down taxes and preserved the status quo
for large property owners and industrialists.” He exempted
74
himself from this category. The previous mayor, in explaining
his fiscal policy, noted that "the type of industry we have
in l ew Bedford isn T t sophisticated enough to require edu-
cation." The new mayor said a better education system would
help attract new kinds of industry. One of the new school
committee members said "business leaders" attempted to in-
fluence school committee and mayors" elections and had been
successful prior to the time of this case study. Also, a
top school administrator expressed the opinion that industri-
alists of the type prevalent in Mew Bedford profitted not
only from low taxes, but an impoverished school system that
produced large numbers of high school dropouts to fill the
low-skill, low-paying jobs they offered. He said the elec-
tion of an education-oriented mayor, as well as the decision
by the previous administration to build a new, expensive and
very modern high school, was due to the influx of new busi-
ness leaders who wanted to expand the economic base of the
city and attract new industry. Most of the other inter-
viewees, however, listed only elected or appointed officials—
the mayor, the superintendent, school committee members and
the school administration—as education influentials
. Given
the limited tax base of the city and regressive nature of
the property tax that is used to support schools, it is
quite possible that past mayors, regardless of the benefits
to large property owners and industrialists, had adequate
political reasons of their own to keep taxes as low as
possible. Without further evidence, the above comments can
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serve only as hypotheses for other studies.
In any case, the mayor's influence in budget matters is
clear. Pis influence in budget matters also gave him a
1718,1 °r role ln the area of personnel. The new mayor played
a kev part in obtaining funds to expand the bureaucracy
~
3 deci510n that had far-reaching consequences for the sys-
tem as a whole. The mayor (with other new school committee
members was also influential in decisions to decentralize
personnel selection. Finally, the mayor attempted to use
his control over money to enhance his influence over per-
sonnel appointments. In this he was sometimes, though not
always, successful. Of 22 respondents, ten said the mayor
was highly influential in personnel, ten said he was somewhat
influential and two said he was not very influential nearly
the same as for the school committee. Judging from specific
cases, it appears the mayor, due to his budget powers, was
somewhat more successful in influencing the superintendent
in personnel appointments than his fellow school committee
members
.
In capital projects, the mayor also was more influential
than other committee members, both because of his knowledge
and concern with fiscal matters and as a political leader
who could win approval for new construction from the City
Council and other political groups. The school administra-
tion generally initiated specific ideas for new schools, but
it could not move ahead without the mayor's approval. At
later stages, the superintendent (especially in the case of
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the new high school-a decision tfade before this case study
begins) shared the job of public relations with the .ayor
and sone committee members. He was important in winning
support from parent organizations and civic groups such as
the League of Women Voters.
The mayor had little influence in curriculum matters, and
was no mere influential than any other member of the school
committee m integration. The administration was by far the
most influential in curriculum, both because of its highly
technical nature and because curriculum was not an impor-
tant political issue at the time of this study. In inte-
gration, the mayor was just as anxious as the rest of the
school committee to avoid offending any important group,
especially white parents; therefore, he did not assert his
possible influence except when absolutely necessary.
The Superintendent
As noted earlier, the role of the superintendent was in a
state of transition at the time of this case study. The
superintendent himself observed that his "power had been
diluted" since he assumed the post in 1961. He worked his
way up the ladder in the traditional manner—from within
the system. After four years in office, he was granted
tenure. During his long apprenticeship and the early years
of his administration, he was able to cultivate a paternal-
istic system in which he knew most of the staff personally
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and was able, for the nost part, to choose administrators
he felt he could dominate. The turning point in the cre-
ation of a more bureaucratic system was the creation of a
’’superintendents' council” in September 1970, made up of
a deputy superintendent and four assistant superintendents-
for business, curriculum, special sc. vices and personnel.
Although only the assistant superintendent for personnel
was from outside the system, all five were new to their
jobs. Of the two previous assistant superintendents, one
died and the other retired. However, even before the
bureaucracy was enlarged, other events and developments
were beginning to alter the system,
1 evertheless
,
at the time of this case study, the
superintendent was still the single most important figure
in determining the educational output of the New Bedford
school department. However, his influence was used to
preserve a closed and static system, isolated from many
community pressures, as well as many community needs. His
influence was negative. He was not able to provide
leadership. During this case study, leadership came from
the mayor’s office, prompted at times by community pressures.
Of 23 respondents, 12 listed the superintendent as one of
the most influential leaders in education
—
giving him a
rating no greater than that of the mayor. An educational
consultant to the school department elaborated: "The
superintendent makes the day-to-day decisions, the mayor
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decides the overall direction of education. This was as
true under the last mayor as it is under this one." In
fact, the superintendent's overall influence on education
was much stronger than the mayor's. Innovations promoted
by the mayor were more visible, but the superintendent
usually succeeded in maintaining the status quo.
Ther„ were a number of reasons for the superintendent's
role as guardian, rather than leader, of the system. As
rarily Cittell observed in a study of N'ew York City schools:
"His (the superintendent’s choice is so much dependent upon
his ability to rise within the system that he can hardly be
expected to challenge it once he takes office. His own rise
to power is an indication of his acceptance of established
interests and loyalties; his success as superintendent is
a further measure of his willingness to support and enhance
those interests
. Her comments seem especially appropri-
ate regarding the Hew Bedford school superintendent in 1970.
There were other factors contributing to his lack of
leadership. As cited earlier, he had little influence in
determining the size of the budget. Under fically conser-
vative city administrations, what could have been an impor-
tant role in determining its contents amounted to adding
up the bare necessities and cutting everything else to the
bone. The superintendent also never attempted to develop
the kind of political support outside the school system
that would have enabled him to bring effective pressure on
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in fact, the superintendent’s influence in budget content
was enhanced. It was hi<? ^s idea, for example, to augment the
number of assistant superintendents. He had requested such
action on several occasions under the previous mayor. He
also had an important role (shared with the mayor and the
school administration) in determining how to spend other
new funds.
The superintendent f s passive stance in budget matters
over the years left him badly understaffed. This, combined
with his reluctance to delegate decision making within the
department, was another reason for his inability to lead.
The new assistant superintendent for personnel explained:
,TThe superintendent was overwhelmed. He just couldn’t do
everything. When I came in, there weren’t even any records
on the teachers. Most of the information was in his (the
superintendent’s ) head. When he didn’t remember, he would
ask his secretary (she was his wife).” Another administra-
tor commented: "There is little decision making here.
Everything is governed by policy and routine. We go from
crisis to crisis. We don’t anticipate the future and we
barely handle the past. The school department is governed
by events." When the superintendent finally got the top
administrative staff he needed
.lust to keep body and soul
of the department together, a new pattern of influence
began to take hold. While the superintendent had more
time to provide leadership, he had less control over many
areas of policymaking. Another one of the new superinten-
dents commented: "He (the superintendent) had to choose
between trying to do everything and then taking the blame
when he couldn’t or dissipating his power by delegating it
to the new staff."
Of all issue areas, the superintendent was most influ-
ential in personnel matters. While he allowed patronage
appointments for the mayor and school committee members at
lower levels, he personally chose top administrators with-
out interference, except on rare occastions. Most of the
administrators he chose were promoted from within and select
ed for their loyalty to the system. Of 22 respondents, 19
rated the superintendent highly influential in personnel
matters and the other three said he was somewhat influential
The superintendent not only chose most top administrators,
but also was highly influential in setting up general policy
regarding personnel. He had a major influence, for example,
in the formulation of Job descriptions and mandatory quali-
fications for administrative posts. Minimum teacher certi-
fication standards were imposed by the state Department of
Education
,
but these were not enforced in hiring practices
in Tew Bedford before September 1970. Many uncertified
teachers served as
-substitutes" for years. Also, because
personnel records were practically nonexistent, it was hard
for state officials to enforce the law.
Bespite his major role in personnel matters, the superin-
tendent s influence in this area was somewhat abridged by
developments both before and during this case study. One
of the more important has already been cited—the appoint-
ment of an assistant superintendent for personnel. The new
assistant took over almost all hiring at the level of teacher
and below. He also began to implement personnel policies
not necessarily in keeping with the superintendent's wishes.
The five-member superintendent’s council also discussed
administrative appointments; however, as the superintendent
implied in an interview, this was mostly for show: "I get
& consensus from them, but this is advisory. I use it to
reinforce my position with the school committee. Anyway,
99 percent of the time we agree. n
The organization of a teachers f union and the cohesion it
gained during the strike also introduced a new source of
influence in personnel. Working conditions such as sick
leave and sabbaticals—formerly set down by the superintend-
ent—were now determined in collective bargaining. Even
more important were the seniority powers developed by the
union through contract agreements, arbitration and judicial
action before the National Labor Relations Board. Together
With the creation of the superintendents' council, the growth
fairly strong teacher union was a major factor in the
transition to a more bureaucratic school department.
;he implementation of federally funded education programs
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
and through the Fodel Cities Administration also served to
erode the superintendent's control over personnel to some
degree. Just as the mayor during this case study tried to
use his budget contributions as a lever to influence personn-
el apoointments, the previous mayor tried to influence staff-
mg m the federal programs he had secured for the school
department. The federal program directors hired most of
their own staff (administrative assistants, teacher aides
and a few teachers). Patronage was sometimes a factor, as
well as federal requirements—in Model Cities programs—
that poverty neighborhood residents be given first prefer-
ence in hiring. In some cases, the program administrators
had not previously worked for the school department and,
thus, were not especially loyal to the superintendent.
Some had allegiances, and a base of support among community
groups and the low-income parents of the children their
programs were designed to serve. In one instance, during
the case study period, the school committee approved a
formal Drocedure designed to give poverty residents a greater
voice in personnel selection for federal programs. 12
Finally, in one of the predominantly nonwhite schools, the
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PTA was also granted a formal role in personnel selection. 13
The superintendent strongly opposed both school committee
decisions involving decentralization of personnel selection,
even though in both cases his right to make the final nom-
ination was not (and legally could not be) altered. Never-
theless, the superintendent said he saw those decisions as
a threat. In practice, the parent group had input (not con-
trol) in only one small school. In the federal programs,
the superintendent had little influence even before the
school committee decision because the programs were subject
to special regulations, because they were funded through
special sources and because some of the program directors
and most of the staff were hired from outside the school
system.
In curriculum matters, the superintendent’s influence was
minor compared to that of the administration. Even before
the bureaucracy was enlarged, the superintendent had dele-
gated most of the responsibility and leadership in curri-
culum to his two assistant superintendents. When the assist-
ant superintendent for curriculum was appointed, she became
the most influential person in curriculum matters. Of 13
respondents, 11 listed her as most influential in curriculum.
When the headquarters staff couldn’t handle the job, it was
left to principals and department heads. Several top ad-
ministrators commented that "the bureaucracy takes care of
curriculum because no one else cares” and ”that (curriculum)
S4
IS the last thing anyone worries about around here.”
The superintendent completely abdicated any influence he
might have had in integration matters. He accepted school
committee dictates without protest (leaving committee mem-
bers to shoulder the political consequences) and delegated
the technical work to other administrators.
In the area of capital projects, as noted earlier, the
superintendent was important in originating plans for the
new high school, but would never have gotten them approved
without political leadership by the mayor and some school
committee members. Capital projects approved during this
case study were mostly the result of severe overcrowding
due to population shifts in the city and to state pressure
to construct new schools for desegregation purposes. The
influence of the mayor, not the superintendent, was also a
major factor in these projects.
The Bureaucracy
By September 1970, the bureaucracy included the deputy
and four assistant superintendents, plus about 25 program
directors and coordinators at central headquarters. The
system’s 60 or so principals and assistant principals and
eight department heads made up the field supervisory staff.
All administrators in the system, with the exception of the
assistant superintendents, were members of the teachers’
union, despite their supervisory roles. During his two
years m office, the mayor with whom this report is con-
cerned added about six administrators to the staff, mostly
assistant principals.
As the few Bedford school department slowly changed from
a paternalistic to a more bureaucratic system, some of the
superintendent's former influence in educational policy-
making began to shift to top administrators, especially the
n*w assistant superintendents. In some cases, lower level
administrators also were able to exert more influence. When
the initial interviews took place in July 1971, none, out of
23 respondents said "the administration" or individual ad-
ministrators, apart from the superintendent, were among those
most influential in educational policymaking as a whole. In
some policy areas, this shift in influence had already taken
place before this case study begins. In others, it had not.
As noted above, the superintendent had already delegated his
influence in curriculum to his two previous assistant super-
intendents. The new assistant superintendents for curricu-
lum and special services (classes and programs for the handi-
capped, potential dropouts, non-English speaking students
and so on) simply continued with the former pattern of in-
fluence, although their policies were somewhat more efficient
and innovative than in the past. Both were promoted from
within the system. Their new jobs meant a change in title,
a larger sphere of influence, but much of the same work they
had been doing previously. The new assistant superintendent
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for business, however, took over many of the tasks previous-
ly performed by the superintendent and his secretary. Even-
tually
,
his influence in budget content and other fiscal
rratters began to supplant that of the superintendent.
The shift in influence from the superintendent to his
assistant was most pronounced in personnel matters. The
new assistant superintendent for personnel was selected by
the superintendent from outside the system (at the direction
of the school committee). He was almost immediately given
control over hiring policies and appointments for teachers
and nonprofessionals. Within a short time, he initiated
policies and practices that represented a distinct departure
from the past. None of these changes were suggested or
strongly supported by the superintendent and one was direct-
ly opposed by him. These changes included widespread teacher
recruitment with special emphasis on black colleges in the
South. The assistant superintendent, who is white, said few
local blacks were certified and available as teachers, while
blacks from other parts of the state would not come to New
Bedford because the -salaries were too low. He said his
small successes in recruiting black professionals (there were
almost none at all in the system when he first assumed his
post) had been through the black colleges. His efforts to
hire more blacks--and several black leaders said they felt
these efforts were sincere—were almost sub rosa. The
superintendent and the school committee sometimes did not
know they had hired a black until he or she reported for
work. While the superintendent did not actively support
black recruitment, he dared not oppose it. The assistant
superintendent said he was most often thwarted by union
seniority provisions and school committee insistence that he
hire "outsiders’* only when there were no qualified local
applicants
.
ihe new assistant superintendent also began to replace
numerous teachers who had never completed state certification
reouirements • I any had been with the system for years
,
but
had never earned a college degree. This action was opposed
by the superintendent— some of the noncertified teachers
were old friends. A school committee member commented:
nThe superintendent was against it, but we had to go along.
State law requires that certified teachers be given prefer-
ence in hiring.” In fact, the state law had not been en-
forced in the past. It took the initiative of the assistant
superintendent to put the law into effect. In practical
terms, the new administrator was able to replace noncerti-
fied teachers because the severe teacher shortage that
plagued New Bedford for years had become a teacher surplus.
A national shortage was aggravated in New Bedford by very
low salaries and the absence of any recruitment program.
By 1971, there was an excess of teacher applicants. Sal-
aries were better, recruitment was underway, area colleges
were beginning to turn out more graduates with a degree in
education and general unemployment had risen.
Finally, the assistant superintendent began to decen-
tralize personnel selection within the bureaucracy. For
the first time, principals and deoartm.ent heads were con-
sulted regularly on teacher hiring and firing and their
recommendations were usually followed. The principals’ con-
tract included a nonbinding item on consultation in teacher
hiring. The new assistant superintendent made this a rou-
tine procedure based on his own philosophy of administration,
which differed a great deal from that of the superintendent.
All of the principals interviewed in 1971 attributed their
recently acquired influence in personnel selection to the
new assistant superintendent for personnel. The assistant
superintendent continued to intervene when black hiring was
at stake or when he differed strongly with a recommendation.
The new administrator
’ s growing influence was not ade-
ouatelv recognized by respondents to the questionnaire. Of
22 persons who answered the question, seven said he was
highly influential in personnel matters. However, one of
these was the superintendent. Six respondents said he was
somewhat influential, five said he was not very influential,
one said he had no influence and two said they didn’t know.
He may have been underrated because his influence was new and
because he used it to decentralize decision making. On the
other hand, his influence in administrative appointments
was small and sporadic. The superintendent still controlled
these choices. The assistant superintendent did not even
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interview candidates for administrative posts. In hiring
teachers and nonprofessionals, however, he replaced the
superintendent as the target of patronage pressures. These
pressures increased with the teacher surplus and rising un-
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The Federal Programs
The federally funded compensatory education programs in
existence in few Bedford during this case study are of
special interest because of their impact in personnel mat-
ters. More specifically, they provided the most important
sntree for blacks and other minority groups (although mostly
in lower level
.iobs such as teacher aides) into what was an
almost lily white school system. The federal programs not
only provided jobs, but also training for minority and poor
white employees with. the possibility of advancement within
the school system (although this has not materialized as
yet to any great degree). Federal funds and federal program
officials also had some impact on curriculum development for
low-income students and school construction in poverty neigh-
borhoods
.
Programs funded by the Model Cities administration in
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s*ven city schools began in 1970. These programs included
a preschool day care project for 60 children, salaries and
training for about 60 teacher aides, a breakfast and lunch
program and planning funds for a new school in the South
Knd rod el Cities neighborhood.
1
^ The new school is still
in the planning stages, but federal guidelines and federal
involvement, as well as the persistent activities of various
civil rights and community groups, have given low-income
neighborhood residents some influence in the actual plans
approved to date. !,rhen Model Cities funds dried up in 1973,
the city continued the breakfast and lunch program (on a city-
wide basis), the day care program and the employment and
training of teacher aides with local monies. Several black
respondents and a few white ones commented that the use of
federal funds to hire teacher aides and other staff was
tTthe only way minorities could get into the schools.” The
Model Cities education coordinator was a school department
employee, but was hired from outside the department. He
had previously been an administrator with the local Model
Cities Administration.' Almost all of the staff was hired
by him or other program administrators. He noted that of
some 200 persons he had nominated for employment, only a
handful were rejected by the superintendent and the school
committee. In June 1970, the school committee approved a
mechanism whereby applicants for jobs in the Model Cities
education programs would be interviewed by both the school
92
department and the Model Cities Planning Council (made up of
elected representatives from the Model Cities neighborhood).
The nominations of both the superintendent and the council
were to be presented to the school committee in cases where
they differed. This mechanism, however, was probably less
important in hiring practices than the fact that most of the
Model Cities employees, including all but one top admini-
strator, had never worked for the school department before.
The education coordinator explained, "The superintendent
has to rely on his subordinates because he doesn't know the
people.” Ke said the mayor attempted to interfere in hiring
more often than the superintendent. Even though patronage
was a factor in some appointments, most program employees
were residents of low-income neighborhoods (this was en-
couraged by federal guidelines), including many members of
minority groups. Of seven top administrators in Model
programs
,
three were black. There were only three
black administrators in the entire system. The black
teacher aides were retained by the school department when
Model Cities funds were phased out, but the black Model
Cities administrators were not.
All other federal education programs were funded under
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. They
were implemented in schools throughout the city (depending
on the number of welfare families in the school’s enroll-
ment district) in 1966. These programs are still federally
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funded. In 1970, these programs included compensatory
education (remedial classes and after-school tutorials),
bilingual and other special instruction for non-English
sneaking students, a busing program for desegregation and
a nreschool education program. Their effect on minority
and poor white employment, mostly in lower-level jobs, has
been much the same as that of Model Cities programs and for
many of the same reasons. While fewer ESEA administrators
are hired from outside the school system, the staff includes
many low-income and minority group persons in lower-level
jobs. A city-wide parent advisory council for ESEA pro-
grams was formed in 1970, mostly due to pressure from state
education officials and local black parents. However, the
council had none of its formally prescribed influence in
curriculum development and personnel selection at the time
of this case study. It was used (not very successfully) to
give parents the illusion of participation. Plans were pre-
sented to the council at the very last moment or after they
were a fait accompli.
The Teachers 1 Union
The Mew Bedford Teachers 1 Association, a rational Edu-
cation affiliate, was recognized as the official bargaining
agent for Mew Bedford teachers in 1966. A 1965 state law
had granted public employees the right to form unions and
bargain collectively, but made it illegal for them to strike.
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The union negotiated its first contract with the school com-
rrittee in 1967. 15 It was not until after union members went
on strike in September 1969, however, that the organization
began to develop real influence in education policymaking,
shortly before the strike, the union added a special unit
for administrators and was renamed the New Bedford Educators
»
Association. Union membership increased the influence of
administrators over their own salaries and working conditions,
but tended to reduce their influence in personnel matters
where teachers (fellow union members) were concerned be-
cause of the obvious conflict of interest. Union leaders
and the overwhelming majority of union members were teachers.
The cohesion and young, aggressive leadership that de-
veloped within the union during the strike gave it far more
oower and influence in subsequent contract negotiations.
Since the most sizable portion of any school department bud-
get is devoted to salaries, the union gained more and more
influence in money matters as it grew stronger. Its influ-
ence in personnel matters that are generally considered
working conditions” was also enhanced during the case
study period, even more so because the new mayor and the
new school committee members were inclined to be less rigid
in this area than past officials. The union also could call
on its political support of committee members during the
election campaign for some favors at the bargaining table.
In addition, the union began to develop a strong seniority
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system regarding inter-school teacher transfers. This was
accomplished partly through contract agreements and partly
through arbitration and court suits. While the union had
no influence in the selection of new teachers, it was
able practically to guarantee teachers already in the system
first choice of openings in other schools, on the basis of
seniority. This eventually meant openings at the secondary
level more often than not were filled by elementary level
teachers who wanted to "move up" in the system. The
assistant superintendent for personnel complained that the
union had once forced him to place an elementary teacher at
the high school who was "totally unoualified" for the new
slot. The union had less influence in promotions to the
administrative level, but it sought to reinforce the existing
policy of promotion from within whereever possible. In
general, the union’s influence in personnel helped to
preserve the status quo. Its seniority system, for example,
blocked several proposed appointments of black teachers.
One union leader said he felt inbreeding and internal pro-
motion had a major inhibiting effect on education, but he
was trapped by his role into a position of having to defend
it. Other union leaders also indicated that they were some-
times torn between educational goals and the narrower in-
terests of their members. In some cases, the union trans-
cended narrow interests. For example, the union publically
did nothing to block a decision to give parents at one
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elementary school a voice in the selection of teachers. In
private
,
union officials cooperated fully with the plan.
Hnion leaders probably had more freedom in this case because
older, often more conservative, teachers were not involved.
Teachers as a group had very little influence in curriculum,
integration or capital projects. The union did make some
attempts to exert influence in curriculum, matters. It won
some minor rights in bargaining and set up committees on
curriculum and in-service teacher training. For the most
part, however, the union lacked the time and staff to pro-
pose alternatives to policies formulated by the administra-
tion. At the time of the case study, it was mostly unsuc-
cessful m making internal inroads into the administration's
control over curriculum matters.
State Education Officials
Although sometimes ignored (as in the case of teacher
certification), state minimum standards in education had a
major impact on policies in few Bedford. Large scale
changes, in fact, were provoked by new state regulations
during and since the case study period, notably in the areas
of education for the handicapped, bilingual education and
school lunch programs. In other areas, state officials
were able to wield influence through their authority to
grant or withhold funds. State officials were the major
catalyst in integration policy, as described earlier.
97
ThCy al5° Served as a so^ce of information and support
for civil rights and other community groups that were trying
to bring pressure on the local school committee in this area.
The state T s concern with integration led it to bring effec-
tive pressure in the area of school construction as well.
plans for several new schools were approved during this
case study as a long-range solution to integration. The
new schools were needed in any case to replace outdated
ones, but they almost certainly would not have been approved
for many years without state pressure. As administrator of
federal E5EA funds, the state also attempted (halfheartedly)
to ensure parent participation in curriculum development
for compensatory education programs. The state was mostly
unsuccessful in these attempts at the time of this case study.
Since that time, the ESEA parent advisory council has en-
hanced its influence through its own efforts and by pressur-
ing state ofj icials to, in turn, pressure local administra-
tors.
Parent Organizations
Tender normal circumstances, parents and parent organi-
zations had little influence on education policy. Parents
were not organized on a city-wide basis. Every school in
the system had a PTA at the time of the case study, but
only eight had regularly scheduled meetings. Most of these
groups were organized by the principal and followed his
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leadership. In only two cases did PTAs attempt to influ-
ence policy on any kind of sustained basis, and both of
these groups were attached to predominately nonwhite schools
where civil rights and integration were important issues.
one of the two schools, the Carney Academy in the
city’s T/Jest Fnd
,
parents gained access to decision making
for the school through the sehool system’s only black assi-
stant principal. He had worked his way up through the system
in the tradition manner and was promoted to principal of the
school in 1971. Fven as assistant principal he made an
active attempt to involve both parents and black community
groups in curriculum, personnel and integration policy for
the school. During 1970, the white principal of the school
cooperated in these attempts to involve the community. Black
parents and leaders mostly ignored the white principal and
took their concerns directly to the black administrator. The
black assistant principal also enhanced his influence with
the central administration through support from black com-
munity groups, especially the United Front. The school
became a source of pride for the black community. During
racial disturbances in the summer of 1970, not one window
at the school was broken, although nearby buildings were in
flames. It was the only elementary school that taught
black history, and five black teachers were hired at the
school during the time of this case study, recruited by the
school’s black administrator with assistance from parents
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and community leaders. After the 1970 riots, the school
also began to receive additional financial assistance from
federal antipoverty programs. The PTA drew up its own
integration plan, similiar to one adopted by the school
committee m 1971. This plan would not have achieved com-
pliance with the state racial imbalance law if the white
neighborhood school had not burned down. It involved volun-
tary in-busing of whites only. Several black parents from
the school said they preferred quality education and a voice
in school policies to forced integration.
The other active PTA was at the Greene School in the
city's South End. At this school, black neighborhood parents
joined with white middle class and upper middle class parents
who volunteered to bus their children to the school to achieve
racial balance.
r.any of the white parents were socially prominant and
some were educators who were familiar with educational jargon.
They were probably the PTA T s real source of power and in-
fluence. The PTA argued that its attempts to solve inte-
gration by voluntary means entitled it to special consider-
ation. The school committee granted the PTA the right to
participation in curriculum development and personnel selec-
tion. The PTA was allowed to interview prospective teachers
for the school and had what amounted to veto power over
appointments. The attitude of the new school committee was
also an important factor, as well as the fact that the
teachers T union did not oppose the proposal. In 1969, under
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th- former school committee, the same PTA was completely
ipnored in its attempt to push through the appointment of
a black principal. The FTA’s candidate was not part of
the school system at the time. A white principal from
within the system was appointed instead. The white principal
generally coonerated with the PTA after his appointment.
School committee members said white parents at other
schools, acting as individuals, had some influence on the
committee 1 s anti-busing, anti-redistricting decisions. On
the other hand, black parents at the time of this study had
mostly given up on integration and were focusing their atten-
tion on "quality education." In the past, black influence
in integration had been mostly through state officials.
Community Groups and Citizen Participation
In addition to public officials and specialized educa-
tion interest groups, there were a number of general interest
groups in the community that had potential influence in
education matters. Two civil rights organizations were
among the general interest groups that most actively sought
influence in education during this case study. These two
were the local NAACP chapter and the United Front, repre-
senting the black community. They were most influential at
the Carney School, as described earlier. They also served
as support groups for the Greene School PTA. In terms of
the system as a whole, their influence was almost entirely
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limited to integration matters. In this, they were most
effective by putting pressure on state officials, who in
turn could bring pressure on local officials. Black groups
had little direct influence with local officials because they
were not integrated into the local political system. At-
large elections made it extremely difficult to elect a black
school committee member. While the liberal attorney, and
possibly some of the other new school committee members,
displayed more sympathy toward black concerns than past
officials, this concern evaporated when the interests or
wishes of whites were threatened. For example, although
several black groups issued reports and public statements on
the drastic underrepresentation of blacks on the professional
staff, none of these groups were able to force the issue
before the school committee for public debate, much less
official action.
Two other groups—Puerto Ricans and recent Portuguese
immigrants—had enormous educational needs that were not
being served by the school system. Both of these groups
were too poverty stricken and disorganized even to complain.
The school department spent about 150 percent as much on
Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking students as on other stu-
dents, but the additional monies came from state and federal
sources. This money was not enough to meet the needs of
these students. The two poorest schools in the city in
terms of physical facilities and classroom materials served
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mostly Puerto Rican and Portuguese immigrant children.
Neither of the schools had a PTA. Groups representing the
established Portuguese community did little to assist recent
immigrants in education matters during the case study period.
oivic organizations representing white middle- and upper
middle
-class citizenry did not even attempt to influence
education policy during the time of this case study. Of
these groups, only the League of Women Voters had been active
in the recent past, and then only as a support group for
proposals originated or endorsed by the school administration.
Large taxpayers, business leaders and organizations repre-
senting them also took no public stands on education issues
during the time of this case study. Several respondents,
including the new mayor, suggested such groups and individ-
uals had influenced previous mayors to hold down the school
budget. School committee members, during the case study
period, said they received no pressure from the business
community regarding increased school expenditures. There is
some evidence the wealthy took an interest in and tried to
influence school committee elections. The dentist, because of
his ties with the local Republican Party, might be considered
a representative of business interests on the committee. In
the past, businessmen or their representatives were commonly
elected to the school board. The pre-1970 school committee
included a travel agency owner, elected in 1947; an attorney,
elected in 1963 to replace a physician who died in office after
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16 years service; a large property owner and real estate
agent, elected in 1941; a dentist, elected in 1941, and the
two members remaining in 1970—the attorney’s wife, elected
m 1951, and "Mr. Republican”, elected in 1955. Further study
is needed to determine conclusively when and how business and
industrial interests influenced school policy. Most of those
interviewed for this study were unable or unwilling to pro-
vide such information. It is almost certain business leaders
did not participate in personnel decision making, the major
emphasis of this study. Of 22 respondents, none said they were
highly influential, two said they were somewhat influential,
five said they were not very influential and 13 said they
had no influence. Two said they didn’t know. Local poli-
ticians, on the other hand, were involved in personnel selec-
tion at times for patronage reasons as described above.
\
Organised labor was involved in the election of some of
the new school committee members, but made practically no
effort to influence specific education policies. The labor
movement as a whole, apart from school department employees’
unions, had no role in the decision making process except as
occasional beneficiary of patronage appointments through
the liberal attorney.
There is little evidence religious leaders or the
Catholic Church tried to directly influence local education
policymaking during the time of this case study. Religion
may indirectly have played a part in issues such as sex
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education in the schools. The large number of Catholic
school students in Tew Bedford also probably had an impact
on the generally low financial support for public schools.
Several school committee members and top school administra-
tors sent their own children to parochial, rather than public
schools
.
The role of the press in education matters was mostly
innir^ct and difficult to pinpoint. News coverage surround-
ing the teachers T strike was mentioned by a number of re-
spondents as a factor in the election of new school committee
members. The local media provided publicity for groups out-
side the establishment with few political resources other
than protest and persuasion. The activities of civil rights
organizations and the Greene School PTA received prominent
coverage in the local newspaper during the case study period.
However, the newspaper never took an editorial position on
the goals of these groups. In fact, the newspaper took very
few editorial stands on any education issues during the case
study period, and none of these were on issues which the
respondents considered of crucial importance. When public
controversy such as the teacher strike and demonstrations by
civil rights organizations forced education issues into the
news, the Dress probably played a role in the process of
change. In most cases, it served the status quo by remaining
silent on important issues, except to report official de-
cisions •
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CHAPTER IV
MAJOR PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND HOW THEY WERE MADE
I ost of the persons interviewed in the course of re-
search for this case study were asked to list the most
influential actors in education generally, as well as in
five policy areas-budget, capital projects, integration,
curriculum and personnel. Conclusions based on their re-
sponses together with supporting documents and observations
have been summarized in the preceding chapter. In the area
of personnel, it is clear that both patterns of influence
and the process of policy formulation were transformed
during the time period studied. At the beginning of the
study, the school department could be characterized as a
closed, paternalistic system, dominated by the superintend-
ent. His influence in personnel decision making was used to
maintain the status quo and few other actors participated
in such decision. Gradually, the system became more open
and decision making in personnel matters became more de-
centralized. Two major factors were involved in this change
1 ) the reorganization of the bureaucracy, and 2) the growth
of a strong teachers’ union. Two other factors also played
a part the activation of community groups dissatisfied with
the educational output of the system; and rising unemploy-
ment, together with a surplus of recent college graduates,
resulting in fierce and unprecedented competition for school
department Jobs,
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None of these changes took place overnight. However, two
different configurations of influence in personnel policy
emerge during the case study period. In the early part of
the study, the superintendent’s control of personnel policy
and appointments was rarely challenged. He ran the depart-
ment like a home business, keeping
i rsonnel records mostly
m his head. The teacher shortage was so severe, he was
happy to fill openings with just about anybody. For that
reason, political pressures from the mayor and school com-
mittee members were beside the point. He rarely consulted
subordinates in making appointments. He chose most admini-
strators from within the system, and his nominations were
usually apnroved by the school board without much discussion,
ihe teachers’ union had little influence except in salaries,
and community groups seeking a voice in decisions were ig-
nored (especially under the pre-1970 school committee).
By the end of the case study period, many aspects of the
superintendent’s influence in personnel policy had been
eroded. Although the new school committee members openly
opposed some of his policies and defeated his recommendations
on a few occasions, by and large, his influence vis a vis
the school board was much the same as in the past. However,
his own staff (led by the new assistant superintendent for
personnel) was beginning to escape his control. The admini-
stration initiated and implemented some personnel policies
that were opposed by the superintendent. His influence was
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crucial in administrative appointments, but lower level
appointments were usually made without his advice. Un-
employment and the teacher surplus greatly magnified poli-
tical pressures at all levels of personnel selection. The
teachers’ union was also beginning to make inroads in some
areas of personnel policy. Finally, in one or two instances,
community groups were able to bypass the superintendent and
win a voice in decision making from the school board.
To further test and explain attributions of influence in
personnel policymaking, respondents were asked to describe
their own role and/or that of other actors in certain key
personnel decisions. Informants were also asked to list
personnel decisions they felt were "most important in terms
of their overall effect on education." In other questions,
informants were asked to describe issues they felt were
important, but on which no formal decision was reached. Of
the issues and decisions selected for discussion here, one
was cited as important by nearly every respondent. It is
the decision to reorganize and enlarge the central admini-
stration. Its impact on patterns of influence and policy-
making process has already been described. This decision
will be reviewed in conjunction with the corollary decisions
on staffing the new administrative posts.
The decision to allow parents at the Oreene School, a
predominantly black elementary school, a formal role in
personnel selection was cited as important only by the
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school principal and individuals from the community who
participated in the decision making process. Still, it was
the only other decision mentioned as important by more
than two respondents. Also, it was selected for discussion
below because it represents a challenge to the status quo—
a closed system in which only professionals (theoretically
at least) were involved in personnel selection.
Three personnel actions that did not in themselves have
a major effect on overall policy will also be described
because they serve to illustrate the relative influence of
various actors and the process by which decisions were made
during the case study period. In one, the mayor unsuccess-
fully attempted to replace the superintendent’s nomination
for an assistant principal at the high school with his own
candidate. In another, the school committee overturned the
superintendent’s recommendation that a young, innovative
teacher be fired. In the third decision, 52 new posts for
nonprofessional employees were routinely created and filled
with political appointees.
Finally, one issue will be examined on which no formal
vote was ever taken by the school committee. It is the
severe underrepresentation of nonwhites among the school
department’s professional staff and the need for corrective
action in this regard. This issue was selected because it
demonstrates the manner in which an issue can be sidetracked
and avoided by elected officials when it threatens the
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existing allocation of resources (jobs) and the values and
self-interests of those in power. The issue also illustrates
the inability of some segments of the community to influence
policy because they lack relevant power resources.
Reorganization o.f the Bureaucracy
l/hat respondents and later evidence indicates was the
single most important personnel decision during the case
study period was initiated, formulated in detail, debated,
approved and implemented by only a handful of major actors.
Of these, only two—the mayor and the superintendent—stand
out as principal influentials
. Members of the school com-
mittee, and perhaps the superintendent’s chief administrative
assistant before the reorganization, were secondary actors.
In specific terms, reorganization of the bureaucracy in-
volved a set of formal decisions rather than a single one.
These included approval of the plan in principle in January
1970, appropriation two weeks later of salaries for three
additional posts effective July 1970 (two assistant superin-
tendents were already in the budget); ratification, in
separate votes, of each of the new administrators. Formal
action by the City Council was also required on the entire
school department budget, including the new salaries. How-
ever, the council had no legal power to alter the budget.
The reorganization plan was initiated and formulated
almost exclusively by the superintendent, although he dis-
cussed some of the details with his assistant superintendent
no
M„„. In f, oti h< Mt ref
1u®sted ...l.t.nt, 1
„ p,r,drail flw
.ears earlier. These posts were approved, but salaries
'"ere ^Ver provided
> despite repeated appeals from the
sup.. intendent. The enlarged plan was presented almost
immediately after the new school committeemen took office.
The superintendent commented: ->1 saw a new committee was
coming in, so I decided to try again." Details of the pro-
posal were discussed first in executive session (as was the
case for all decisions of any consequence). The scheme was
later approved unanimously in public meeting. The new school
committee members were already committed to change. The
superintendent said the plan would improve education because
would allow for better planning and coordination. The
mayor and the liberal attorney announced their support right
away. The attorney said later he also hoped the reorgani-
zation would decentralize power within the department. The
other new members were easily persuaded. The two veterans
V ’ere c °nvinced by the superintendent’s arguments that addi-
tional staff, especially in business and personnel, would
enhance efficiency.
When money was the issue, all of the new committee members
deferred to the mayor. The two long-time members thought a
deputv and two assistant superintendents
—for business and
personnel—would be enough for one year. They suggested the
other two assistants be funded in 1971. The superintendent
Ill
indicated this arrangement would be acceptable. However,
the mayor insisted that curriculum and special services were
most important in terms of education. All of the proposed
n„w posts were funded. The two fiscal conservatives voted
against the funding package at a public meeting, explaining
they thought it was ‘’too much, too soon."”*
When the full school budget was presented to the City
Council in larch, some councillors took advantage of the
occasion to grandstand about the tax burden. A few denounced
the creation of ’’plush
”
jobs, such as the new administrative
posts, and threatened to cut the budget. However, it was
well known that the courts had routinely restored school
budget cuts voted by city councils or town meetings in the
oast, usually adding a penalty fee. The superintendent and
several new school committee members defended the budget as
”an exDression of concern for the children of New Bedford."
The two fiscal conservatives on the committee did not attend
any City Council sessions on the budget, but made no attempt
to oppose it at this stage. Only one councillor actually
voted to reduce the budget. Finally, the council took no
action to either approve or disapprove the package and the
budget automatically went into effect.^ The whole procedure
was simply window dressing. School committee members said
they were never contacted privately regarding the size of the
budget. Any serious attempts to influence the mayor took
place before the budget reached the City Council.
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The new administrators were selected by the superintendent
with little influence from anyone else. Shortly after the
budget took effect, he nominated the assistant superintendent
for secondary education to fill the new post of deputy super-
intendent. The selection had been a foregone conclusion and
was approved without ouestion. However, the deputy died a
month later. leanwhile, the school committee—at the sug-
gestion of the liberal attorney—instructed the superintend-
ent to select some of the new administrators from outside the
school system, preferably from outside the area. The super-
intendent followed this suggestion. It was the only real
influence exerted by the committee. By September, the four
assistant superintendents were appointed. There were only
a few applicants for each post. They were interviewed by
the committee and the superintendent discussed his proposed
nominations in advance, at least with the two veteran members.
But there is no evidence the superintendent was influenced
except to look outside the system. Even so, he did not ad-
vertise the openings extensively. The superintendent happened
to have an out-of-state applicant for high school principal
he liked. The superintendent had someone from the system in
mind for principal, but he ^suggested the "outsider" apply for
assistant superintendent for personnel. A former New Bedford
teacher and friend of the superintendent who had most recently
held a U.S. Army career post that involved business administra-
tion was named assistant superintendent for business. The
assistant superintendents for curriculum and special services
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were promoted from within the system. One was a friend of the
superintendent. The other was the only school department em-
ployee, besides the superintendent, with a doctorate degree,
another deputy superintendent was named in December 1970.
The superintendent had tried to persuade a school superin-
tendent in a neighboring town to take the job. When he re-
fused, the superintendent chose another colleague—the head
of teacher placement at a nearby state teachers’ college.
The superintendent’s influence as initiator of the plan
was due to his specialized knowledge and control of manpower
(his staff). The school committee, even with what members
saw as a political mandate for change, was unable to orig-
inate alternative policies that required technical knowledge.
The mayor’s crucial influence in funding the new proposal
was due to the same political resources that he used to get
elected
—
popularity, commitment of followers, political
know-how, among others. His influence also depended on the
political tradition and institutions that made him respons-
ible for the tax rate. In other terms, of course, his in-
fluence depended on his ability to form a winning coalition
on the school board. In the selection of the new admini-
strators, the superintendent’s influence was due to his
exclusive authority to nominate, his special knowledge about
the candidates and the duties they would be required to
perform, what committee members 1 perceptions of his ability
to judge educational qualifications and finally, traditions
of administrative prerogatives. Thus, the superintendent
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was highly influential when strictly "educational” matters
were concerned. When issues were involved, such as money,
that concerned actors outside the educational system, he
had little influence. His power resources were no longer
applicable. In such cases, the mayor or others with more
generalized power resources were most influential.
Decentralization at the Greene School
On June 26, 1970, the school committee granted a slate
of requests by the Greene School Parent-Teacher Association
that gave the parent group unusual veto powers in the selec-
tion of professional personnel. 3 The PTA had been seeking
such powers since 1962. Under the previous school committee
they had tried bargaining, arguing, picketing and boycotting,
all to no avail. Their influence was effective in 1970
only because of the existence of special receptors (the new
school committee members) for the resources they were able
to muster. These resources included moral persuasion, social
access to some committee members, knowledge in education
matters (several of the PTA leaders were educators) and
publicity. Referring to the pre-1970 committee, one of the
parents commented, ”we never would have gotten this before.”
In particular, the decision provided for a special pro-
cedure in hiring teacher aides, teachers and administrators
at the school. The superintendent was to refer all candi-
dates to a screening committee made up of the school principal
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and four PTA members. The screening committee would inter-
view each candidate, keep records and report to the super-
intendent. He, in turn, would interview and nominate only
those candidates approved by the screening committee. At
the same meeting, the school committee approved additional
teacher aides for the school and granted "the principal and
teachers" the right to divise their own teaching methods and
to implement special curriculum. This was to be done in co-
operation with the assistant superintendent for curriculum.
The school committee approved the requests by a vote of
4-1. Lr. Republican" and the professor were absent. Voting
in favor were the mayor, the liberal attorney, the teacher
and the social worker. The other veteran committee member
said she felt the requests were "contrary to the responsibil-
ities of the school committee" and would create "chaos" in
the school department. Later interviews indicated "Mr.
Republican" would have voted against the request and the
professor for it. The decision was opposed by the super-
intendent. At the meeting, he unsuccessfully attempted to
substitute an alternative plan in which the PTA would present
its opinions to the school committee if it did not agree with
his recommendations.
The PTA’s demands grew out of a parent-originated plan
to integrate the racially imbalanced school by voluntary
in-busing of whites. In the summer of 1963, the school was
to be closed because of declining enrollment. Concerned
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black parents in the neighborhood solicited the assistance
of liberal white parents who lived near the school, but not
ln th ® S0h001 district. Together they persuaded the school
administration to keep the school open. It was to attract
whites by providing special educational advantages. At the
tire, school administrators viewed this as an easy solution
to integration in at least one school. However, the super-
intendent had no intention of allowing the. school or the PTA
special privileges.
From 1962 until June 1970, the PTA was involved in a long
series of struggles to secure the "special features" for the
school that members felt the superintendent’s promise to
assist in attracting whites implied. In the summer of 1968,
the PTyi at its own expense and without permission—-adver-
tised for teachers, interviewed them and presented a slate
to the superintendent.^ All of the previous teachers had
been transferred to other schools when the Greene School was
to be closed. It was hard to find teachers at the time, and
especially so for a predominantly nonwhite school. The
superintendent was irritated by the PTA’s initiative, but
eventually recommended teachers from its slate because he
couldn’t find anyone else. In October 1968, the PTA pre-
sented the superintendent with a list of requested policy
changes similar to those approved in 1970. These were ig-
nored and later rejected by the school committee. The
parents attempted to bring pressure on the school committee
through state officials. State Education Commissioner Neil V.
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Sullivan wrote the committee a letter praising the parents
and citing the school’s voluntary busing plan as unique
m the state. 5 However, in this case, state pressure was
ineffective because no state funds were at stake. In June,
the principal who had constantly been at odds with the PTA
for what she considered interference in educational matters
such as curriculum and teaching methods—asked to be trans-
ferred to another school. The PTA then launched its most
extensive and hard-fought battle with the previous school
committee.
In late June, the PTA endorsed a black man for principal
of the school. The superintendent immediately made it known
that the PTA’s candidate was not "qualified" because, although
he had taught in the school system for several years, he had
not served as assistant principal. At the time, he was
employed as an administrator by the Model Cities Administra-
tion. The parents asked for a special school commdttee
meeting to discuss the principalship. The committee did
hold a special meeting in mid-July, but without notifying
the parents. The superintendent’s nomination of an assist-
ant principal from within the system was quietly approved.
For the next month, the PTA picketed City Hall, the school
department headquarters and the businesses of school committee
members, carrying signs such as "A Black Principal for a
6
Black School" and "Black Leadership is Necessary". In
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September, the PTA called a fairly successful school boycott
in the effort to persuade the school committee to reconsider
its decision and appoint the black. The committee refused.
In a few weeks the boycott was called off and the PTA went
back to its previous attempts to bargain and coax concessions
out of the school committee and the administration.
After January 1970, the PTA appeared twice before the
school committee to ask for minor innovations. These were
granted, but none of them altered existing structures and
processes. In April, three teachers at the school announced
their resignations, charging that most attempted innovations
at the school had been blocked by the central administration.
The resignations received extensive and relatively sympath-
etic coverage in the local newspaper. In fact, most of the
PTA’s struggles since 1968 had been covered in depth by the
newspaper. Some of the white PTA leaders had social access,
not only to the new committee members, but also to the news-
paper publisher and reporters. Editorially, the newspaper
had opposed "community control of schools," but commended
the parents for their involvement and enthusiasm. How-
ever, this publicity had little influence before 1970 because
the previous school committee members were not receptive to
it or to members of the general community whose sympathy the
news coverage may have aroused. The new school committee
members were more sensitive to what they saw as general
community support for innovation.
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The proposals approved in June 1970 were drawn up by par-
ents both white and black. The principal participated in
planning sessions, but followed the lead of the parents.
Pe probably saw this as the only way to get along at the
school without undue aggravation. Also, the proposals had
the effect of increasing his own professional prerogatives
vis a vis the central administration. Some observers—
black and white—suggested the white parents dominated the
planning sessions because they were more knowledgable in
education matters. However, black parents actually involved
in the decision denied this. The blacks probably worked
hardest to bring about the changes. They did most of the
demonstrating and shouting; the whites did most of the ar-
guing and bargaining. They also took the initiative in
soliciting white support and participation. However, their
only resources were subsystem solidarity (they were sup-
ported by several black community groups) and protest. The
whites were probably most influential with the school committ-
ee—as educators themselves, as friends of some committee
members and because the committee saw the whites—not the
blacks—as contributing to a politically popular solution
to integration. At the June school committee meeting, the
mayor told one of the white parents, "I’m more willing to
cooperate with you because of what you are doing for us,
9
sending your children to the Greene School.
Before the June meeting, parents visited each of the
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school committee members at home to explain the proposals.
Their major argument was that the proposed changes were nec-
essary to attract more whites to the school voluntarily-in
OL,hor words
,
to achieve integration without offending the
white majority. Indirectly, increasing state pressure to
integrate this and other few Bedford schools may have had an
effect. The white parents who were educators (in local
colleges) were able to usurp some of the superintendent's
usual influence by displaying the same knowledge of techni-
cal concepts he had. Three other factors were involved.
The central administrator who was named assistant superin-
tendent for curriculum soon after the decision had worked
with the parents and was sympathetic to their educational
goals. She did not approve of parental participation in
personnel selection. Also, the teachers' union made no at-
tempt to clock the proposed changes. Finally, there was no
community opposition to the decision. It v;as basically a
contest between the central administration and the parents
for influence with the school committee. At the June meeting,
the plan was discussed for about an hour and approved without
sn^ of the heated arguments that had marked earlier encounters
between the PTA and the conmittee.
The parents won because their diffuse resources happened
to converge on receptive power holders in this particular
case. The school committee had a mandate for change and was
more sensitive to community pressure than in the past. New
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members saw the administration as representing policies that
had not worked. Some of the parents had specialized know-
lecge and social access to community leaders. They were
able to command a great deal of publicity and they were backed
by cohesive civil rights organizations. Also, integration
Wris involved a matter on which the committee traditionally
acted with greater independence from the administration.
Ano finally, the decision affected only one small school.
All of the black parents said they would have preferred more-
sweeping changes, such as the right to interview candidates
a^long with the administration and to present a single nomin-
ation. They did not ask for as much as they wanted because
they thought it would represent too great a challenge to the
existing system. They said they would continue to work for
greater control. The new procedure was used effectively by
the parents in the selection of three new teachers for the
1970-1971 school year. Since then, the parents have been
able to influence curriculum and other policies at the school
to some degree. There has been little teacher turnover. The
parents’ influence still depends very much on their continued
struggle and vigilance.
Appointment of a Vice-Principal
The appointment in July 1970 of a new vice-principal at
the high school was chosen for discussion because it illus-
trates the interplay of influence between the mayor and the
superintendent. As in other decisions, the superintendent’s
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hinged on tradition and his authority to nominate; the mayor's
was based on his control in money matters.
The post that was filled was one of the many new ones
crested by the 1970 school committee—a third vice-principal-
ship. During an executive session in early July, the super-
intendent proposed the vacancy be filled by one of his layal
supporters, a department head who had taught in the system
for many years. The mayor said he wanted the post filled by
another man who had taught in the system only a few years,
but who happened to be the mayor’s campaign manager in 1969.
The two veteran school committee members rallied to the sup-
erintendent’s support on the basis that he was best able to
judge educational qualifications. Also, they had no poli-
tical ties to the mayor. The teacher supported the mayor as
he almost invariably did. The social worker and the liberal
attorney were absent. The superintendent and his two support-
ers were able to win over the professor. He had conducted
his own campaign and owed the mayor few political debts
(unlike the teacher). As an educator, he opposed strictly
political interference in appointments that had an impact on
education. At the public session, the appointment was blocked
by s 3 vote. A four-vote majority was reauired for appoint-
ments
.
In private discussions before the next meeting, the super-
intendent refused to nominate the mayor’s candidate in this
case. He could not have done so at this point without pub-
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lically embarrassing himself. Also, the social worker indi-
cated he would support the superintendent for "educational"
reasons. The mayor had less personnel and political leverage
with him than with the teacher. However, the mayor was able
to extract an agreement from the superintendent to nominate
his (the mayor’s ) candidate for a fourth vice-principalship
if funds could be provided for the additional post. The
superintendent thought a fourth vice-principal was needed in
any case. The two veteran committee members who supported
the superintendent on appointments were opposed to additional
expenditures for a fourth slot. The social worker and the
professor would not support the mayor on a political appoint-
ment, but agreed to create another post, especially since this
was also recommended by the superintendent.
At a meeting in late July, the superintendent’s candidate
was confirmed unanimously by the school committee. Later in
the year, the fourth vice-principalship was created on a 5-2
vote. In 1971, the mayor’s campaign manager was nominated
for the new post by the superintendent and approved by the
committee. Both of .the candidates had similar educational
philosophies. If the superintendent had found the mayor’s
candidate educationally objectionable, he probably would
have refused to nominate the man at any time. Most of the
superintendent’s objections were based on personal power
considerations. Local news coverage of the incident is of
interest. The matter was reported as a simple disagreement
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between the mayor and the superintendent in which the
superintendent emerged victorious. There was no mention
that the mayor ’s candidate hapoened to be his campaign
10
manager.
Keeping a Job: It Pays to Have Friends
In the spring of 1971, the schoo^ committee overruled the
superintendent’s recommendation that a young teacher be fired.^
This decision was also selected to demonstrate patterns of
influence. The superintendent was supported by the principal
and all of the assistant superintendents except the assistant
superintendent for curriculum. The teacher was supported
principally by the mayor, but also by the teachers’ union and
some prominent members of the Jewish community. The decision
was unique, but it indicates possible limits of administrative
influence in personnel matters.
The teacher had incurred the wrath of the principal and
the superintendent by going over their heads to initiate a
series of special courses at the high school. In the fall
of 1970, the teacher simply asked to be on the school committee
agenda. He proposed the administration implement a series of
short ’’mini-courses” to be offered as electives to students
who otherwise would be forced to take a study period due to
crowded conditions at the high school. The courses were to
be taught by community and teacher volunteers on subjects
proposed by the students. The committee indicated its in-
125
terest, but referred the matter back to the administration. 12
ihe principal and the superintendent objected to the plan on
practical grounds (space, scheduling, etc.), but could find
little excuse to do so on educational grounds—there was
an obvious need for something of this sort. The teacher and
a xew colleagues continued to work on the program in 1970,
but the principal used numerous delaying tactics to keep it
on ice. When the new assistant superintendent for curriculum
took over in September
,
she supported the program and it
was implemented in November 1970. The teacher and his friends
did all of the work, ihey raised necessary funds from pri-
vate donations and recruited instructors from the community
and the teaching staff.
In the spring of 1970, however, the principal recommended
the teacher 1 s contract not be renewed for the following year,
he cited what he said was the teacher’s inability to maintain
discipline in the classroom. The assistant superintendent
for personnel went along with this recommendation. He was
just implementing his system of decentralized personnel
decision making. He also took a dim view of the teacher’s
educational philosophies and methods. The assistant super-
intendent for curriculum had assisted with the program and
supported the teacher.
Under normal circumstances, the administration’s recommend-
ation would have been followed. However, the teacher was a
personal friend and political supporter of the mayor and one
of the school committee members (the teacher). The professor,
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the liberal attorney and the social worker followed the
mayor’s lead this time because, theoretically, his reasons
were educational f a note in favor of curriculum innova-
tion)
,
rather than political. Also, the new committee mem-
bers had earlier committed themselves to the controversial
program, not in direct opposition to the principal and the
superintendent, but to their obvious displeasure. The two
veteran committee members voted to sustain the superintend-
ent’s recommendation. "Mr. Republican" said his decision
was ’based on the advice of professionals—the principal,
the superintendent, and all of the assistant superintend-
ents except one."
The mayor and the committee members who agreed with him
had more influence in this case than in most routine personnel
decisions for several reasons. The decision involved firing
rather than hiring, and the superintendent’s legal powers to
nominate were not a factor. VThile personal and political
considerations influenced the mayor and one committeeman,
interference in the administrative process was easier to
justify because, in part, the committee was being called on
to arbitrate between philosophical factions of the profess-
ional staff. In this sense, the curriculum administrator’s
support for the teacher probably made a difference in the
votes of some committee members. Arguments by the teachers’
union on the teacher’s behalf also reinforced the idea that
an educational philosophy, rather than purely personal or
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political factors, was at stake. If any of the elements that
lead to the decision had been missing, the result could have
been different. These elements included the teacher's friend-
thin With the mayor and another committee member; the school
committee's interest in change and its distrust of the super-
intendent; the committee's earlier commitment to the"mini-
course" program; the superintendent's lack of special legal
powers in firing as compared with hiring, and the division
within the administration over the superintendent's recommend-
ation. Even so, the principal had his way in the end. The
teacher resigned a year later. He said the ill will of super-
iors made it impossible for him to function.
Run-of-the—Mill Patronage
In June 1971, the school committee appointed 52 night
watchmen for city schools. ^ The committee had created the
new posts a month earlier at the superintendent’s suggestion.
He was concerned about extensive and increasing vandalism of
school property. The schools were also plagued by a growing
number of burglaries. When the posts were created, the
superintendent and assistant superintendent for personnel
agreed that each committee member could submit a list of
proposed nominees and that these lists would be used in
making appointments. This arrangement was suggested by the
liberal attorney and endorsed by the mayor. TtMr. Republican”
also made use of the agreement. Other committee members sub-
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mitted only a few names because they had fewer political
ties and ambitions 0 The assistant superintendent, who was
in charge of selecting the nominees, explained that he
considered such appointments unimportant in terms of edu-
cational policy. Allowing patronage at this level, he said,
made it easier to resist patronage pressures at the level of
professional appointments. The school committee was able to
circumvent Civil Service regulations in this case because the
posts were new and no Civil Service list existed. Normally,
patronage was a factor only in temporary nonprofessional
jobs and marginal professional posts such as supervisors in
the night school. The watchmen later had to take a Civil
Service examination, but were removed from their j*obs only
if they failed. In making the final nominations, the assis-
tant superintendent said that he reserved about 15 percent of
the slots for nonwhites he recruited through various commun-
ity organizations. He chose the rest from the school commi-
ttee’s patronage lists.
Recruitment of Nonwhite Professionals
Although some administrative action was taken during the
case study period to recruit black and other nonwhite pro-
fessionals, no decision was ever publically discussed, much
less approved, by the school committee in this regard. The
black leaders and organizations that tried to influence the
school committee in this matter had little, if any, impact.
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The action taken depended almost entirely on the personal
views of the assistant superintendent for personnel.
As noted earlier
,
the school department professional
staff was almost lily white in January 1970. Minority
group persons made up less than one percent. In February,
a coalition of black community groups submitted a report to
the school committee, comparing the city’s 15 percent minor-
ity student enrollment with the tiny number of minority
professional employees. Blacks were also underrepresented
among nonprofessional employees. The report called for the
adoption of an ’’affirmative action plan” with specific goals
and timetables for improvement in minority employment. 1 ^
The report was accepted and filed without discussion. Black
leaders raised the issue of affirmative action at public
school committee meetings on several future occasions during
the case study period, always without provoking any kind of
action. They also attempted to discuss the matter privately
with school committee members. The two veterans were cate-
gorically opposed to affirmative action. Both described the
concept as ’’reverse discrimination.” The social worker, the
professor and the teacher paid lip service to the idea in
private and offered to discuss it with administrators, but
they refused to take public action for fear of offending whi-
tes. There is no evidence they acted on the issue privately
either. The mayor and the liberal actually did discuss the
matter with the superintendent. He did nothing about it.
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Although both the mayor and the attorney had received vis-
ible support from the black community in the election, they
claimed they could not act more forcefully on minority
hiring because other committee members would not support
them.
Minority employment in the school department did increase
during the case study period, but very, very slowly. It
never even approached representative proportions. An offi-
cial policy of active recruitment supported at all levels
would be necessary to overcome past and existing discrimin-
ation. Black organizations had real influence in hiring only
at the Carney Academy and the Greene School. At the Carney
Academy, the black principal not only recruited black tea-
chers on his own, but sometimes persuaded black teachers
recruited by the assistant superintendent for other schools
to transfer to what the principal and other blacks viewed as
a black "community" school. The assistant superintendent
also recruited a number of black teachers and a few admini-
strators. He said he was most successful in hiring blacks
from the South. His efforts, he said, were impeded by a
number of factors. According to the assistant superintend-
ent, these included the scarcity of local black college grad-
uates. It is true the general level of education is low in
New Bedford, and it is even lower for nonwhites. Most local
blacks who did attend college left the area for better-paying
jobs, the assistant superintendent maintained. He said some
of his black nominees were opposed by the school committee
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on the grounds that qualified local candidates had been
turhed away in favor of an "outsider ." Union seniority
provisions also tended to impede minority recruitment, he
said. Finally, of those hired, some left after a year be-
cause they were "harrassed by superiors and fellow teachers,"
he said. Others left because they were offered more money
elsewhere. In October 197 the school department reported
that nonwhites made up 3*8 percent of the professional staff
—
an increase of only about three percent over 1970. At this
rate it will be another 1 5 years or so before the nonwhite
professional staff is fully representative of student enroll-
ment.
At the nonprofessional level, a number of minority group
persons were hired as teacher aides in federal programs during
the case study. As noted earlier, federal program directors
were influential in hiring their own staff and some had ties
with the black community. Also, educational requirements
were not an issue and federal regulations encouraged non-
white employment. Very few blacks held Civil Service jobs
in the department 0
Blacks as a group were unable to influence personnel
policy, except on a very small scale, because they lacked
effective power resources. Parenthetically, the Puerto
Rican community did not even attempt to influence personnel
matters during the case study. While blacks had subsystem
solidarity on some issues, they were not integrated into
the local political structure. Even if they voted as a
block, in at-large elections, their numbers were not suffi-
cient to command major political clout. Also, since racial
discrimination is a highly emotional issue with white voters,
politicians generally felt the white voters they might offend
by any aggressive action on civil rights issues would out-
number the black support they might gain. In general, blacks
had to rely on protest and persuasion—not very effective
resources compared with those controlled by more influential
actors
.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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Since the Case Study
A number of trends identified during the case study
period have continued in some form to date. These include
the shift of influence from the superintendent to the
bureaucracy; the growing influence of the teachers’ union;
the more active and controversial role in decision making
of some school committee members; increased pressures from
committee members and the mayor for patronage apoointments
,
and more, although very limited, participation in decision
making by some parents and community groups. One major trend
has been reversed—the mayor’s active involvement in not only
fiscal, but also ’’educational” matters, and his willingness
to provide for major increases in school spending. In
November 1971, the mayor in this case study was defeated by
a political newcomer, who was reelected in 1973. The new
mayor campaigned on a platform of fiscal austerity in 1971,
and since that time, has attempted to keep his promise at
least as far as the school budget is concerned. Neverthless,
most of the new personnel and programs added during the case
study have been retained. Very few new ones have been
funded. To explain the mayor’s defeat goes beyond the limits
of this research; however, several factors may have been in-
volved. The reform mayor was not part of the former power
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structure and his fiscal policies aroused the wrath of busi-
ness and real estate interests. Middle-income voters who
may have approved his efforts to improve education, may also
have decided they couldn’t afford the large tax increases
that resulted (the tax rate increased $44 per $1 ,000 valu-
ation during his term) • This view might explain why the
mayor in this case study was elected to the state senate
1by a wide margin in November 1974* Perhaps voters felt
better education and other services are needed, but the
state rather than the city should bear the cost. The
present mayor appears to have allied himself with the pre-
vious Democratic machine, at least in part. He rarely
attends school committee meetings, but heads a coalition
that is fiscally conservative and clearly less open to
pressure from blacks and low-income parents.
Only three of the 1970 school committee members were
still in office in 1974—"Mr. Republican", the liberal
attorney and the social worker. None of the new members
defeated an incumbent, however. The only other veteran
member (besides the dentist) in 1970, "retired" at the end
of her term in 1972 after 20 years of service. The professor
resigned in 1972 after serving only two years of his four-
year term. They were replaced by two political allies of
the present mayor. The liberal attorney easily won re-
election in 1972. (He originally filled a two-year slot
vacated by the pre-1970 committee member who died.) The
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teacher did not run again when his term expired in 1974. He
was replaced by another liberal-a fireman who has supported
civil rights issues and organizations and who is active in
his local union. On some issues (especially fiscal matters
and community participation in policymaking), the committee
is now divided into two loose coalitions. One, headed by
the mayor, includes his two political allies and "Mr. Republi-
can. The other, headed by the liberal attorney, includes
the fireman and the social worker.
One major change in personnel since 1972 is perhaps a
result of the dramatic shift in school committee members
that took place in 1970. The superintendent chose to retire
prematurely in June 1972—five years before his normal re-
tirement age. He now teaches at a nearby teachers 1 college.
He stated publically that he wanted to let his successor
open the new high school in September. Privately, however,
he said he was tired of repeated opposition from the school
board. At the suggestion of the liberal attorney and sup-
ported (in this instance) by "Mr. Republican", the school
committee made a nationwide search for the new superintend-
ent. The replacement chosen was an assistant superintendent
in a New York community about the same size as New Bedford.
It was the first time since 1922 that the school committee
had gone outside the system for a new superintendent. The
new administrator had previously worked in industry and most
recently had helped develop programs for underprivileged
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students. He promised both to reduce the dropout rate and to
bring "business-like attitudes" to the job
.
2
Analytic work by Laurence Iannacenne based on field
studies in California paralleled events in New Bedford with
great accuracy." He suggests that changing socio-economic
conditions—in particular, sizable in-migration—will lead
to changes in the values and interests of the community.
A struggle for control of the decision making processes,
including school board membership, will result. Competition
for seats on the board will result in frequent changes in
board memberships as different groups alternate in control
of the board. Finally, he says, the superintendent’s tenure
will be affected as alternate power cliques gain control of
the board. Iannacenne also endorses the following hypo-
thesis based on an unpublished survey of all school districts
in four California counties:
The selection of a new school board will lead to or
be followed by the selection of a new superintendent
within three years, who will be an outside man....
The continuance of an old school board will result
in the continuance of an old superintendent. When
an old board is faced with the selection of a new
superintendent, it will choose from within the
organization.^
The explanation given is that the new board has a mandate for
change and sees an outside superintendent as the change
agent. Most dramatically, the California studies found that
the defeat of only a single incumbent board member was
usually sufficient for the predictions to be borne out. The
concurrent retirement of two or three board incumbents alone
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v.-as an important indicator of superintendent turnover. Most
respondents in this study said the school committee turn-
over in 1970 was a result of the teachers’ strike. Ianna-
ccene’s work suggests it may have been due to even more
fundamental changes in the city’s population and power struc-
ture. It is of some interest that the dentist—one of the
former superintendent’s strongest supporters on educational
(net fiscal) policies
—
joined forces with the liberal attor-
ney in the move to go outside the system for a successor.
The present mayor was not especially enthusiastic about the
idea
.
As might be expected, the new superintendent appears to
be somewhat more aggressive and innovative than his prede-
cessor. He had initiated, for example, a number of policies
and programs designed to lower the dropout rate—with some
success, as cited earlier. Nevertheless, he is hardly more
influential in fiscal matters than was the previous super-
intendent. Other trends identified during the case study
seem to have continued, but at a slower rate. Top admini-
strators still are gradually enhancing their influence in
curriculum, budget content and personnel policy matters.
The teachers’ union also has strengthened and institutional-
ized its influence in limited areas—salaries, seniority and
working conditions. This, despite a far more antagonistic
city administration. Minority groups and low-income parents
have even less influence with the school committee than in
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the past, but they have gained a few additional victories
bv pressure brought through state officials. The Carney
and Greene schools remain as exceptional examples of
community influence in policymaking, but other schools in
the city have not attempted to follow their lead.
The Case Study Findings
One of the most striking features of the decision making
process in f ew Bedford during the case study period was the
interrelationship between influence in separate issue areas
—
in particular, the important bearing of budget matters on
personnel policy. The mayor T s control in money matters
made him indirectly, and at times directly, influential in
several personnel decisions. The impact of the mayor’s
budget influence was enhanced in New Bedford because—as in
many urban communities—municipal tax resources were limited
and in demand from many quarters. Many studies have found
that the mayor’s influence in budget size was great and often
dominant. However, such studies typically suggest that
influence is rigidly divided between external matters such
as the budget and internal policies—curriculum, personnel
and budget content.^ While it is true that technical ex-
pertise and access to information make the influence of the
superintendent and the bureaucracy crucial in ’’educational”
issues, this case study suggests that actors who control or
influence fiscal policy can also exert important influence
iuo
in supposedly internal matters. This may especially be true
when unusual increases in the budget are involved.
Because money is such a generalized and persuasive power
resource, others who controlled private and public finances
could be expected to wield at least indirect influence over
school policies. If they did so in New Bedford it was through
the mayor (principally) and some individual school committee
members. Businessmen and other large taxpayers undoubtedly
had an interest in how much money would be spent on schools.
In a study of Massachusetts school districts, Gross found
that big taxpayers were by far the most common source of
pressure against school tax increases. Pressures to augment
the budget came largely from parents and teachers. 7 James
and his colleagues cite examples in which the superintendent,
school board members or the mayor regularly consulted with
the Chamber of Commerce in determining the size of the budget.
They note that most business and industry groups oppose in-
creased expenditures. However, in a few cities economic
leaders actively supported increased spending as nan invest-
ment paying high and predictable dividends to the economy.
Those business interests in New Bedford that opposed in-
creased school spending apparently were unsuccessful in in-
fluencing the mayor during the case study. Evidence suggests
economic leaders were most active in attempts to influence
mayoral and school board elections, rather than specific
issues. While there is no evidence economic leaders tried
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to influence internal personnel policies or even top appoint-
ments within the school system, this case study demonstrates
the indirect effect budget policies can have on many other
issues
•
The mayor’s influence in budget matters depended not only
on local traditions, but also on his ties to the community
political structure-at-large and what he saw as a specific
political mandate for change. The case study suggests that
political know-how and ties to local political parties and
organizations were important power resources for other actors
as well. Besides the mayor, the onlv school committee mem-
bers who displayed any initiative in personnel and other
issues were ,TMr. Republicann and the liberal attorney. The
The attorney was an active member of the local Democratic
Party and the dentist, "Mr. Republican,” was head of the
local Republican Party. Both were active in seeking patron-
age, along with the mayor. They were also able, on certain
internal issues, to act with independence from the superin-
tendent and the bureaucracy, as well as from other members
of the committee. Other new committee members had a poli-
tical mandate for change, but usually followed the leader-
ship of the mayor or the liberal attorney because they lacked
political know-how and organized , on-going constituencies
with a broad base. One previous study published under the
pseudonym of Norman D. Kerr suggests that lack of specific
constituencies is a major factor in the traditional school
14 2
board acquiescence with bureaucracy-initiated policies. The
author notes that without political party ties, school
board members are subjected to organized and on-going press-
ures only from large taxpayers and other economic influen-
tial
.
9 Gross found that the motive of "civic duty" for
running for the school board was highly related to subse-
auent conformity with the expectations of the superintendent,
while the motives of ’’representing some group" and "gaining
political experience" were found to be negatively related
to conformity
.
10
Martin also states that schoolmen are
better able to mold policies to their will when dealing with
an amorphous public than when talking to Republicans and
Democrats. The case study research here indicates that
ties with political parties or some other on—going, insti-
tutionalized pressure group are a major factor in school
board initiative. It also suggests that groups which hope
to influence school policies will be more successful if
they are able to work through existing political organizations.
The superintendent’s influence in personnel and other in-
ternal issues was due not only to his superior knowledge of
department affairs, but also to what Oittell terms "the
public’s acceptance of technical expertise as the most rele-
vant, if not the only, basis for sound judgment" in educa-
tional policymaking. ' Legal powers (such as the power to
nominate^ and institutionalized procedures were also an
enormous asset. Even those school committee members with
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strong political ties usually had to depend on professionals
(sometimes differing factions within the department) to
initiate and formulate alternative policies. The increas-
ing influence of the bureaucracy (in relation to the super-
intendent) came about almost entirely as top administrators
replaced the superintendent in fact, and in the eyes of the
school committee, as experts in specialized areas. Minority
and low-income parents who sought to influence school poli-
cies were handicapped not only by the lack of political
muscle, but also by what the decision makers saw as their
lack of expertise. Technical knowledge in educational
matters was an important factor in the unusual influence the
Greene School PTA was able to muster. Parents and other
community actors that may hope to influence policies on any
more than a sporatic, one-shot basis will have to institu-
tionalize access to detailed information as well as formal-
ize less restrictive decision making procedures. In addition,
they will have to overcome entrenched resistance from many
school administrators and public attitudes about the pro-
fessional monopoly on "correct" educational ideas. This,
despite the fact that traditional training often leaves
professionals ill-equipped to deal with the educational needs
of peer and nonwhite students.
The superintendent’s ability to implement many personnel
and other internal policies was limited by lack of funds.
His lack of influence in fiscal matters was due to his rela-
tive isolation from politics outside the school system*
This withdrawal from external politics was in part self-
imposed. It may have been necessary to insure influence in
other issues. It may also have been a product of the school-
man’s view of education as ’’above politics.” James notes that,
”Few city school administrators
... perceive themselves as
part of the same political world as assessors and city coun-
cilmen. The general view of educators appears to be that
they would rather be isolated than risk municipal control.”^
In discussing personnel policy, the superintendent himself
commented: ”1 live in a political world. I see myself as
a buffer. I try to keep politics out of the school depart-
ment and to dispell ideas that politics are a factor.”
Thus, the superintendent tried to avoid political struggles
in the community-at-large, and when he was forced to acknow-
ledge them to, at least, create the illusion that the school
was above politics.
The increasing influence of the teachers’ union during the
case study was due in large part to the cohesion which de-
veloped during the strike and the more militant legacy that
remained afterward. The union’s influence was greatly en-
hanced by the role it played in the school committee election
as well. Also, state labor laws and the 1965 collective
bargaining act for public employees were major prerecmisites
for teachers’ union influence. James lists the following
factors in teachers’ union influence: solidarity of rank-
145
and-file support; militancy of union leadership in threaten-
ing a strike; revenue flexibility of fiscal decision makers;
political importance of unions, and local attitudes toward
union membership for public employees. 1 ^- Rosenthal adds to
the list, rank-and-file satisfaction with the educational
status quo, organizational resources in terms of skills and
finances and state legislation regulating employer-employee
relationships
.
1
^ Both of these researchers found teachers 1
unions were almost powerless except in salaries and working
conditions. As noted earlier, labor unions in New Bedford
played a sizable role in the local Democratic Party. The
teachers’ union was also able to evoke a good deal of public
sympathy during the strike. However, as the post-strike
effects have worn off, the union has relied more and more
on the courts and give-and-take negotiations to increase
its influence than on rank-and-file militancy and public
support. It played a far less important role in the 1971
and 1973 school committee elections. As in other studies,
the New Bedford teachers’ union is most influential in
salaries and working conditions. However, the major impact
of seniority provisions on personnel policy output has al-
ready been discussed. Martin and others have noted that
teachers often are torn between a desire to alter the status
quo to enhance their own influence and their instincts as
bureaucrats to support the existing closed system of decision
16
making. During the case study and since then, the New Bed-
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ford teachers’ union has maintained an adversary relationship
with the superintendent and other top administrators (even
though middle management is part of the union). During the
case study, it made no attempt to block parent participation
in personnel decisions at the Greene School, and since then
it has aligned itself with minority groups and other ex-
cluded actors in the community on several issues involving
increased participation. High unemployment among teachers
and general community attitudes about labor unions may help
to explain the union’s stance. The union’s future role as
a pro- or anti-educational establishment force is still in
doubt. Also, its attempts to influence policies outside its
prescribed sphere have continued, but so far have been largely
unsuccessful.
In sum, the superintendent almost entirely controlled in-
ternal personnel policies and had overwhelming influence
in appointments and promotions at the beginning of the case
study period. During the course of the study, large areas
of his control and influence were taken over by the assistant
superintendent for personnel. The new administrator in turn
began to decentralize some decision making to middle manage-
ment levels on his own initiative. The superintendent re-
mained highly influential in top administrative appointments.
The mayor, because of his control in fiscal matters, was also
able to wield considerable influence in a few major personnel
decisions. However, his influence in day-to-day decision
U7
making was minimal. If the trend of encroaching bureaucra-
tic influence continues, top administrators may even further
dilute the superintendent’s influence in personnel policies.
The assistant superintendent for business may even usurp
some of the mayor’s traditional influence in money matters.
James reports that in some districts, the top business ad-
ministrator has a substantial degree of influence over fis-
cal decisions in city government, and ’’may serve over a peri
od of decades as the principal liaison between the education
al an<^ political worlds.” In such systems, he says, there
is often a ’’bifurcation of power,” with the superintendent
wielding major influence in educational matters and the
business administrator in control of fiscal policies. How-
ever, some strong business managers have used fiscal powers
to influence educational policies as well (as the mayor did
in this case
.
)
Other actors had far less influence in personnel policy.
Of these, the teachers’ union was most important. In many
ways, its influence served to reinforce the status quo.
Seniority provisions encouraged inbreeding and indirectly
blocked some attempts to hire more minority persons. How-
ever, the increased salaries it was able to negotiate helped
make the school system more attractive to teachers and ad-
ministrators from other areas. However, union leaders sup-
ported (privately, if not publically) efforts to involve
parents and other community actors in personnel decision
making. The union’s influence increased from almost nil
before the strike to a more and more decisive one within a
limited domain. This domain was prescribed by state law and
traditions of employer-employee relationships. Many areas
of personnel policy are outside these bounds, and if the
union s influence is to go beyond them, enormous changes
will have to take place in society-at-large, as well as in
the internal politics of the school department.
Civil rights organizations also attempted to influence
personnel policies, but were unable to do so on a system-
wide basis. They had the same cohesion that helped the
teachers’ union influence policy, but lacked other impor-
tant resources such as money, political contacts, sufficient
numbers and control of production (and the ability to strike).
At the local level, they used protest as a resource to gain
influence in two schools. In the near future at least, their
influence in general issues such as sensitivity training for
teachers and affirmative action in hiring will probably de-
pend on appeals to state and federal officials.
Parents, as a group, had almost no influence in personnel
policies. In the two schools where they did, their efforts
were tied to civil rights issues. Kerr notes that on the
rare occasions when parents have been able to effectively
influence school policies, they are usually spurred to
action by a nationwide controversy which has been carried to
1
8
. „
the community through the mass media. Some parents m New
Bedford may have simply been satisfied with the status quo.
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Many probably were not. However, in most cases their com-
plaints were completely disorganized. They also lacked
political know-how, as well as any institutional vehicle
through which to channel their ideas. Community and nation-
al traditions fostered by professional educators probably
would have prevented them from demanding institutionalized
participation in policymaking even if they had the political
resources to bring this about. In the exceptional case
where parents won institutionalized participation, a nation-
al issue, civil rights, was involved.
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APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR INTERVIEWS
CODE NO.
1. Name:
Date of Interview
2. Address:
3. Telephone:
4. Would you tell me the names of the most imDortant andinfluential leaders in the matters of educational
community even if they do not hold public
office?
5. Suppose you were going to run for a seat on the school
committee, who are the people you would be most likely
to contact in order to get their backing and support
so that you would have a good chance of winning?
6. If a decision were to be made in Boston that affected
education in this city, who would be the best contact
men to get in touch with state officials?
7. Who . would be the best men to get in touch with federal
officials in Washington on some local problem involving
education?
S. Four new members were elected to the school committee
in the last election. Were there any events in the
community or political, economic or social develop-
ments which may have contributed to the turn over?
9. Education policy may be grouped into five subject areas
—
They are budget matters, capital projects—including
remodeling; curriculum; personnel policies and inte-
gration policies.
In policy decisions related to the school budget, who do
you feel is especially influential?
In capital projects?
In curriculum matters?
In integration policies?
10. This study is primarily concerned with personnel policy
in education. Here is a list of groups and individuals
who may be influential in personnel policy. How would
you designate their influence in this community?
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APPENDIX* QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)
Designate their influence in this community:
High Somewhat Not Very No Influence
Mayor
School Committee
Asst. Supt., Personnel*
Principals
NBEA
PTA Groups
Model Cities Officials
Civic Organizations
Civil Rights Groups
Catholic School Officials
Business Leaders
Newspaper
Labor Unions
11.
Some studies of other school systems have shown that
the superintendent of schools pretty well runs education
affairs and that his influence is decisive in most of
the important decisions. In your opinion, is this an
accurate description of the way in which things are done
here?
Why is it?
12.
As I mentioned before, this study is especially con-
cerned with personnel policy. There are undoubtedly some
issues and decisions in this area which you feel were more
important than others. In terms of their effect upon the
education in general in New Bedford, which personnel
decisions in the past two years do you feel have been
most important?
Were there any issues during that time which you feel
were important, but on which no formal decision was
reached?
13.
Here are cards with the names of issues with
which our study is especially concerned.
a. Beginning with issue no. one, were you involved in
any way in this decision?
b. Did you support or oppose the decision?
c . Would you have preferred an alternative policy? If
so, what?
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APPENDIX
: QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued
)
d. Hok much controversy surrounded this decision—
a
little, some or a great deal?
e. Do you identify anyone—individuals or groups withhaving originated the proposal which led to thisdecision?
How were they able to bring this policy before the
school committee?
f
• .
A-ter the policy was first suggested, were anyimportant amendents made?
Which
. individuals or groups were instrumental inbringing about such amendments?
How?
g.
Which individuals and groups were involved in
working out details of the policy?
How were they involved and why?
h. Which individuals or groups worked hardest to bring
about this decision?
How were they able to influence members of the school
committee?
i. Which individuals or groups were opposed to the
proposal? How did they try to influence the school
committee?
j. Who would you say were the two or three persons who
you feel were most influential in determining the out-
come of the decision?
k.
.
Do you think the outcome would have been different
if they had not participated?
l. At what state did you become involved in the decision
and how did that come about?'
m. Who benefited most from the decision?
APPENDIX, QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)
Mow I would like to ask you a few questions about yourselfand your background,.
1 . Do you have school age children?
How many attend public schools in this community? Whatgrades are they in? How many attend narochial schools’Other private schools?
2. Have you ever served on any committee connected with the
schools? What kind of committee was this and when were
you on it?
3 • Here is a list of the members of the school committee
and the superintendent. Some of these people may be your
close friends and others you may know only casually or
not at all • Indicate how well you may or may not know
each person.
Rogers
Walsh
Ferreira
Hayes
LeTourneau
Xifaras
Boucher
Worden
Hayden
4. How long have you lived in New Bedford?
5. How old were you on your last birthday?
6. Where were you born?
7. What was the last grade of school you completed?
S. Marital status?
9.
What is your present occupation in as precise terms
as possible?
10.
Which daily newspapers do you subscribe to?
11. What is your political affiliation?
12. Would you characterize yourself as liberal, conserva-
tive or middle-of-the-road in politics?.
13* What kind and how much participation in education
decisions do you feel parents and other members of the
community should have?
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, QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued
)
14 • Do you feel students should have more
community? Should students have a voice
policymaking?
rights in this
in education
15.
Do
.
you favor forced busing to achieve racial inte-gration?
16. Do
.
you feel (drastic) changes are needed in present
curriculum programs in order to provide a better
education?
17. What is your religious affiliation?
13. If people ask you your nationality or descent, how
would you identify yourself?
19. What was your father’s place of birth?
20. What kind of work did your father do most of his life?
21. What was the last grade of school completed by your
father?
22. Is or was your father highly active in community
organizations or affairs?
23. Is or was your mother among the social leaders of the
community?
24. I wonder if you would look at this card and tell me
the letter which corresponds to your family’s income
from all sources before taxes in 1970?
25. Now we would like to get some idea of the various
organizations in which you have been active in this
community. What elective or appointive governmental
offices have you held since I960?
Title of office: Dates of office?
26.
Have you been a member of any committees or commissions
created to deal with a local community problem since
I960? For example, a committee on drug abuse, or to
attract industry to the city?
Committee: Position:1 Dates:
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27. Have you been on the boards of directors of any privatecorporations or banks since I960? } P
L
28. What
member
Health
connmnitiy service organizations have vou been aof? For example, the PTA, United Fund, MentalAssn.?
Pave you been a member of any business organizatilike the Chamber of Commerce or the National Assn.
o
Real Estate Dealers?
ons
f
30. .What professional organizations have you belonged to
since I960?
»Have you belonged to any labor organizations since
1 960?
32. What clubs and social organizations like the Rotary
Club or Country Club have you been a member of?
33. What churches and religious organizations have you
belonged to?
34. Have you belonged to any political organizations like
the County Democratic Committee or the Republican
Women’s Club?
35. What veterans and patriotic organizations like the
D.A.R. or V.F.W. have you been affiliated with?
36. What ethnic organizations have you belonged to?
37. What civil rights organizations have you been a
member of?
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school superintendents and other top school administrators.
11 Marilyn Gittell, particinants and Participation:
A Study of School Policy in New York City
. (New York: Center
Urban Education, 1967 ), p. 8.
1 2
The Stan dard-Times
. (New Bedford), June 14, 1970,
p. 3 •
13 Ibid.
,
June 27, 1970, p. 1.
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^Ibid
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4Ibid. August 9
,
1968, p.
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9Ibid
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^Ibid
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^Martin, Government and the Suburban School
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, p. 101.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V (Continued)
f^„.,!
6
\°SSoe MSrtin > Povernnient and the Suburban School .
.
a_u a e, SjT'acuseUnTversit5rTrisT7T95?T7p7_53T_
17 ’
tn- nnl r
H
* Tnomas James ) et al., Determinants of Edura-
f \a, ge
1966), p . ’60
" ool of Education, Stanford University,
•J gNorman D. Kerr
Legitimation
,
rt Sociology
p. 67.
The School Board as an Agency of
of Education
. XXXVIII (Fall 1964),
167
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agger, Robert E., and Marshall N. Goldstein, Who Will Rul*the Schools: A_ Cultural Class Crisis—BeTmontTCalif. : Wadsworth
,
1 971 .
Altshuler, Alan A. Community Control. New York*
1970.
— * Pegasis
,
Anderson, James G. Bureaucracy in Education
. Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, 1968
.
“
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. Power and Poverty.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Bailey, Stephen F., et al. Schoolmen and Politics: A Study
of State Aid to Education in the Northeast
.
Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1962*
Banfield
,
Edward C. Political Influence
. New York: Free
Press, 1 961
.
Bendiner, Robert. The Politics of Schools: A Crisis in
Self-Government *
Bloom, Benjamin S.
,
et al. Compensatory Education for
Cultural Deprivation
. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1 965.
Bloomberg, Warner, Jr., and Morris Sunshine. Suburban Power
Structure and Public Education: A Study of Values
,
Influence and Tax Effort
. Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1963.
Cahill, Robert S.
,
and Stephen Hencley, eds., The Politics
of Education in the Local Community . Danville,
111 . : Interstate
,
1 964 .
Campbell, Roald F., et al. The Organization and Control of
American Schools . Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1965.
Chandler, B.J., et al.
,
eds., Education in Urban Society .
New York: Dodd, Mead
,
1 962.
Clark, Terry N., ed., Community Structure and Decision
Making: Comparative Analyses . San Francisco:
Chandler
,
1 968.
168
Conant, James B. Shaping Educational Policv
MeGraw-H i1 1 , 1964.
New York:
Crain
,
Robert L., et al. School Desegregation
Chicago: National Opinion Research
University of Chicago, 1966.
in the North
.
Center
,
Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs? New Haven, Conn.: YaleUniversity Press, 1961.
Dentler
,
Robert A., et al., eds., The Urban R T s: Race
Relation s as a Problem oif Urban Education.
New York: Praeger, 1967.
Dye, Thomas. "Government Structure, Urban Environment and
Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Poli-
tical Science, XI (August 1967), pp. 353-380.
Eliot, Thomas H. "Toward an Understanding of Public School
Politics," American Political Science Review.LIU (December 1959), pp. 1032-51 .
Fantini, Mario D. Community Control and the Urban School
.
New York! Praeger, 1 970.
~ “
Gittell, Marilyn, ed., Educating an Urban Population
.
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1967.
.
Participants and Participation: A Study
of School Policy in New York City
. New York:
Center for Urban Education, 1 967.
,
and Alan G. Hevesi, eds., The Politics of
Urban Education
. New York: Praeger, 1969.
,
and T. Edward Hollander. Six Urban School
Districts
. New York: Praeger, 1 968
.
Goldhammer, Keith. The School Board
. New York: Center for
Applied Research in Education, 1964.
Gross, Neal. Mho Runs Our Schools? New York: Wiley, 195$.
Havighurst, Robert J. Education in Metropolitan Areas .
Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1 966.
Hawley, Willis D., and Frederick M. Wirt, eds., The Search
for Community Power . Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall^ 1 968.
169
Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure: A Study of
Decision Makers
. Chapel Hill. N.C.: University
of Forth Carolina Press, 1953.
Iannaccone, Laurence. Politics in Education
. New York:
Center for Applied Research in Education, 1967.
James, H. Thomas, et al. Determinants of Educational Ex-
penditures in Large Cities of the United States.
Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford,
University, 1963.
Jennings, M. Kent. Community Influentials : The Elites of
Atlanta. New York: Free Press, 1 963
•
Kimbrough, Ralph B. Political Power and Educational Decision
leaking. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1 964.
Kirst, Michael W.
,
ed., The Politics of Education at the
Local, State, and Federal Levels
.
Berkley, Calif.:
McCutchan
,
1 970.
Lipsky, Michael, "Protest as a Political Resource," American
Political Science Review
,
LXII (December 1 968 )
•
Lowi
,
Theodore J. At the Pleasure of the Mayor . New York:
Free Press
,
1 964.
Lynd, Robert S., and Helen M. Lynd. Middletown . New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1929.
Martin, Poscoe C. fTovernment and the Suburban School .
Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1962.
Masetti, Louis H. Education and Politics in Suburbia .
Cleveland, Ohio: Western Reserve, 1967.
Masters, Nicholas A., et al. State Politics and the Public
Schools. New York: Knopf, 1 967
•
Meranto, Philip. The Politics of Federal Aid to Education
in 1965" Syracuse, N.y. 1 Syracuse University
Press, 1967.
Mills, Warner E., Jr., and Harry R. Davis.
_
Small City
Crovernment : Seven Cases in Decision Making .
New York: Random House, 1962.
170
Pois, Joseph. The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Casehtudy. Chicago: Educational Methods, 1964 .'
Polsby
,
Pelson W. Community Power and Polit.irai Theory.
Few Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963 .
Presthus, Robert. Men at the Top
. Few York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1964.
Rogers
,
David. 110 Livingston Street . Few York: Vintage,
1 9o9 •
Rosenthal
,
Alan. TTAdministrator-Teacher Relations: Harmony
or Conflict?”, Public Administration Review.
XXVII (June 196777 PP. 154-61.
1
»
Governing Education
. Garden City, N.Y
Doubleday, 1969.
—
—
_• Pedagogues and Power: Teacher Groups in
School Politics. Syracuse, N • Y . : Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 1969.
Sayre
,
Wallace S.
,
and Herbert Kaufman. Governing New York
Oity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1 960 .
Schrag, Peter. Village School Downtown: Politics and
Education—A Boston Report . Boston: Beacon
Press
,
1 967.
Toffler, Alvin, ed., The Schoolhouse in the City
. New York
Praeger, 1 968 .
Tope, Donald E.
,
ed., A Forward Look—The Preparation of
School Administrators
. Eugene, Ore.: Bureau of
Educational Research, University of Oregon, I960.
Usdan, Michael D. The Political Power of Education in New
York State
. New York: Institute of Administra-
tive Research, Teachers College, Columbia Uni-
versity, 1963 .
Vidich, Arthur .T.
,
and Joseph Bensman. Small Town in
Mass Society
.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1956.
Walsh, John E. Education and Political Power . New York:
Center for Applied Research in Education, 196/f.
171
Warner, Bloomberg, Jr., and Morris Sunshine. Suburban
Power Structures and Public Education !
Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,
1962. *
Wasserman, William. Education Price and Quality Indexes .
Syracuse, N.r.: Syracuse University Press, 1963.
Wilson, James 0., ed., City Politics and Publi c Policy.
New York: VTile
,
1 968
.
• ^he Strategy of Protest: Problems of
Negro Civic Action, ” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, III (September 1961), op. 291-303.


